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Preface 
The judgment of the German Constitutional Court on the Lisbon Treaty, 
handed down in June 2009, seems too important to be left to lawyers and/or 
Germans alone. On the other hand, its length and technical complexity are bar-
riers to its understanding by a broader, even academic, public. The workshop 
on 25 September 2009 at the Bremen International Graduate School of Social 
Sciences (BIGSSS), from which the present discussion paper originated, 
sought to respond to this constellation. The format of the workshop was inter-
disciplinary and international. Discussants were invited to focus on aspects 
they were particularly concerned about. Our endeavour was not to arrive at 
some comprehensive, let alone uniform, evaluation, but to carry out a multi-
dimensional exploration and debate of a ruling that is extremely contested in 
Germany. 
We considered the workshop a success and therefore want to express our 
gratitude not just to those who delivered written statements but to all workshop 
participants: Michael Blauberger, Damian Chalmers, Marco Dani, Tatjana 
Evas, Björn Fleischer, Michelle Everson, Zoran Janevski, Fritz W. Scharpf, 
Waltraud Schelkle, Susanne K. Schmidt, Marcena Kloka, Rike Krämer, Til-
man Krüger, Gesche Lange, Ulrike Liebert, Deborah Mabbett and Björn 
Schreinermacher. We are also grateful to BIGSSS for logistical and financial 
support. Finally, we thank Kolja Möller for extensive editorial support. 
We hope that our contributions will stimulate readers’ thinking about the 
specifics of different aspects of the GCC’s Lisbon ruling and, starting from 
there, perhaps also more generally about the future of a democratic European 
Union – however this future might be imagined both in form and in content.  
 
Bremen, January 2010 
 
Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Christian Joerges, Arndt Wonka 
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A Few Thoughts on the Lisbon Judgment 
Damian Chalmers 
I have been asked to lay the ground for today so I will give my own potted un-
derstanding of the judgment, aware (partially at least!) of both the limits of 
packing 421 paragraphs of reasoning into five minutes, my ignorance of Ger-
man constitutional law, and the dangers of working off a translation. Any re-
statement has, of course, to work off a legal context which, in this case, is a 
complaint about the reshaping of the EU institutional settlement. However, the 
great thing about legal texts is that they no longer belong to the authors but the 
readers! They thus raise new and, in this case, more interesting issues of which 
I shall mention three: the worrying development of a dualism of legal logic, the 
questioning of regulatory democracy, and the sacralisation of representative 
democracy. Before that, I must say what I understand by the judgment. 
1. A Restatement of the Judgment 
I shall not go through the judgment sequentially but rather bring together ele-
ments stated at different parts of the judgment that combine to bring together a 
four-step logic. This is partially done for coherence and communicability. It is 
also done because a criticism I have of much of the critique of Brunner was 
that it was hubristic and failed to pay attention to the balance and tensions in-
ternal to the reasoning of the GCC. 
Step One: The GCC sets out a constitutional commitment to European inte-
gration, which it roots in Article 23 of the Basic Law. It is perhaps worth setting 
this as a starting point not simply to counter some of the hysterical characterisa-
tions of the judgment but also because, legally, this is the point of departure for 
the judgment. Without the GCC’s understanding of Article 23, it would not be 
possible to ratify many elements of the EU institutional settlement. 
This understanding has two important implications. First, it imposes a duty 
of openness to EU law on all German courts. This involves giving it prece-
dence – a hierarchy of norms – in all but the most exceptional circumstances. 
Secondly, there is a requirement not an option on German political institutions 
to engage in European integration. European integration is not just normatively 
justifiable but imperative. 
Step Two: The principle of democratic self-rule in Article 38 of the Basic 
Law is set out and explained. It provides for every citizen to elect the members 
of the Bundestag under principles of free and equal election. It also provides for 
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this body to be meaningful legislatively. Its powers cannot be substantially cur-
tailed. This principle is rooted not just in Article 38 and the right to vote but the 
principles of human dignity (Article 1) and popular sovereignty (Article 20). 
The GCC then sets out the relationship between this principle and Article 
23, saying that the latter should take subject to this principle. This may be con-
troversial to some but insofar as a relationship had to be established, it is worth 
thinking about the alternatives. If Article 23 was to be given precedence, there 
would be the establishment of a European raison d’état doctrine. Would we 
really want to go back to the C17? The Lisbon Treaty suggests not as even it 
commits itself to representative democracy. It is like arguing that EU law 
should prevail over national fundamental rights provisions. Would we want a 
Europe that commits torture? 
Step Three: The GCC mediation of these principles. Two forms of review 
are established. Ultra-vires review to prevent the EU exceeding the powers 
conferred to it. This will be either when it does not act within these powers in a 
limited way or violates the subsidiarity provision. The second is identity re-
view. This is where it violates central parts of a national constitutional identity 
even when acting within its powers by curtailing the role of the Bundestag by 
legislating in core areas other which the latter should have a monopoly. These 
are the State’s monopoly of violence, fundamental elements of fiscal policy 
and the Sozialstaat, and culturally important fields, notably family, education 
and religious law. 
Step Four: The Implications for Lisbon Treaty. The GCC, almost unneces-
sarily, indicates that it is suspicious of the EU’s democratic credentials meas-
ured as a State. It points to the principle of degressive proportionality, the 
presence of nationality for determining the composition of the Commission 
and Council and the presence of only an inchoate European public. It then ap-
plies ultra-vires view to two fields where it feels the principle of conferral has 
been relaxed. Article 352 TFEU, the flexibility principle, and the simplified 
revision and bridging procedures which allow for procedures to be transformed 
into QMV without an IGC. In both, it seems there must be approval of both 
German parliamentary chambers.  
2. The Dualism of the Judgment 
Although the GCC suggests a unitary constitutional logic indicating (at para. 
235) whereby German constitutional principles apply across all levels of gov-
ernment, this looks rather thin, however, and in practice a dualist logic is oper-
ating. There is the logic of Article 38 – to apply domestically – and the logic of 
Article 23 – a less legitimately thick logic both in its normative priority and its 
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ethical substance – which is to govern the operations (within their powers) of 
EU Institutions. 
This raises a number of questions. The first and most obvious is why bother 
with the EU at all? If it is not that democratic, what is the justification for citi-
zens accepting its laws? Thin analogies are made about preserving peace, but 
this is largely the role of NATO and the OSCE. The justification for the EU is 
surprisingly empty. The second is that it leads to a sacralisation of national 
democracy and abnegation of EU democracy. Leaving aside the former, this 
contrasts very unfavourably with the approach of the Czech Constitutional 
Court which states that its commitment to European integration lies in the basis 
of its being a ‘democratic law-based’ state and the same principles will apply 
across the board. There is a view of the GCC that what goes on in Europe is for 
Europe to decide, and that is profoundly troubling. Finally, there is the rela-
tionship between the different principles of legitimation. At base, the delimita-
tion point is that anything within the five ‘sacred fields’ of constitutional iden-
tity is a matter for national parliaments. Leaving aside demarcation questions, 
they retain the entitlement to be interested and involved in other fields. Regula-
tion, migration and equal opportunities – to take but three – all raise electorally 
explosive and politically sensitive matters. There are the formal arrangements 
for national parliaments to question EU legislation but looked at as a matter of 
political ethics and justification, what happens, for example, if a national par-
liament questions GMO regulation? Is it simply that we must go along with it 
to sustain the European raison d’état? 
3. The Future of the Regulatory State 
It is ultimately not particularly fertile to look at Die Linke in centre-periphery 
terms. At heart, the judgment is about sustaining the place of representative in-
stitutions within a national constitutional democracy. Its central dynamic is 
about the relationship between majoritarian and non-majoritarian institutions, 
and the mood music is that in developing governmentality, public policy and 
regulatory reach insufficient attention has been paid to the place and impor-
tance of the former. It is thus also about thinking of constraints and curbs on 
the former. 
The judgment is thin on this but it raises two important implications. The 
first is that in the development of the regulatory State, its institutions are al-
ways justified by the logic of exceptionalism. Non-majoritarian institutions are 
justified, variously to protect structurally disadvantaged minorities, enable 
temporal consistency, sustain collective goods that could not otherwise be real-
ised, enable the participatory praxis of stakeholders, create a place for sustain-
Damian Chalmers 
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ing expertise. None of these are arguments that apply across all areas of policy-
making but rather to limited fields and all ask for particular privileges (e.g. ref-
erence to particular groups, particular forms of knowledge, the importance of a 
particular policy such as combating climate change or free trade). The judg-
ment is a reminder that these are exceptional arguments and they can claim a 
normative place in debate but not a normative priority. 
This comes out in the idea that the EU should be a limited project. It also 
comes out a little in the contingency of EU law. There should be some scepti-
cism as to regulatory law. Yet because of the dualist logic described in 2, there 
is after 421 paragraphs very little on this. The more sensitive issues have been 
obscured around debates about political system-building. 
4. The Treasuring of Representative Democracy 
The final point begged by the judgment is what is so great about representative 
democracy. I would suggest there are three elements: 
First, representative democracy conveys an idea of fairness and equality not 
present in other versions of democracy. Representative institutions have to be 
representative in terms of different societal groups and they are exercised on a 
basis of a single, indivisible being (constituent power). There is thus within 
them the Arendtian fiction of us as equals not just in having equal voice but 
also equal designation rather than as a stakeholder because of some division of 
labour. This feeds into Durheimian notions of mechanical solidarity, which are 
based on ideas of kinship and sameness (e.g. religion, ethnicity). This leads to 
ideas of communities of strangers bound not by interdependence but by collec-
tive myths. To be sure, there are dangers with this but it is this idea of solidar-
ity that allows ideas of fairness beyond interdependence and of commitment to 
redistribution.  
Secondly, representative democracy ties institutions to an idea of political 
community. There is the idea that they act on behalf of a political subject. This 
is not so strongly present with other forms of democracy, and it conveys the 
idea of politics as something that contextualises, limits, contains and justifies 
political institutions.  
Thirdly, representative democracy ties its subjects to certain values. This is 
not so much in the praxis but in the idea of a community of strangers that ex-
tends beyond time and space. To justify that community and to generate affec-
tive ties, it must tell itself that it does good for its subjects and, importantly, 
that it is a community of good subjects.  
It is precisely these features – no overarching vision of justice or welfare, 
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no stable sense of political community and no affective sense of value that is 
set out in Superego-ish terms – that are not possessed by the EU. Rather than 
manipulate it into a box that does not fit, it might be better to see that these are 
perennial constraints. 
Yet many of these traits are counter-factuals operating largely at the sym-
bolic level. They take no account of the symbols or values that are less well 
protected even symbolically (e.g. minorities and outsiders, ‘non-national’ vi-
sions of justice, or value systems or individuals that do not conform to the gen-
eral good). They do not look at the highly uneven praxis of representative de-
mocracy, with its limited resources, corruptibility and short time cycles. They 
pay little attention to the relationship between government and legislature ei-
ther in how the former can dominate the latter or in how little the latter con-
strains the former. 
This is all worrisome. The GCC looks here as if it was looking at the wrong 
equation: Europe v representative democracy. A better one might have been 
representative democracy v other forms of democracy. Hopefully it will re-
engage with this battle! 
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Looking through Different Glasses at the Lisbon Treaty:  
The German Constitutional Court and the Czech Constitutional 
Court 
Rike U. Krämer 
1. Introduction 
The Treaty of Lisbon was signed on 13 December 2007 and has still to enter 
into legal force, although its enactment was scheduled for the end of 2008. Af-
ter the long-awaited signature of the Czech President Vaclav Klaus the enact-
ment is now scheduled for the first of December. Nearly one year later than in-
tended. This delay is mainly due to the constitutional courts in the member 
states of the European Union (EU). Particularly the referendum in Ireland was 
an Irish Supreme Court requirement. The enactment of the Treaty of Lisbon 
will change the day-to-day life in Brussels extensively. Accordingly, some 
citizens in the member states disapproved that this decision should only be 
taken by their parliaments. In some countries a referendum was demanded1. In 
others people were content with a ruling of the constitutional court regarding 
the constitutionality of the Treaty of Lisbon. Especially in Germany and in the 
Czech Republic this was the case. 
In both countries the German Constitutional Court (GCC) and the Czech 
Constitutional Court (CCC) had a similar task. Yet, their outcomes differ. Both 
courts judged about the compatibility of the Lisbon Treaty with ‘their’ respec-
tive national constitution from a different perspective. The CCC started with a 
quite positive view regarding the European integration process, unlike the 
GCC which was more reluctant in finding positive aspects of the European 
multilevel-regime. Interestingly, the initial position in the two countries, when 
bringing the case to the courts, varied widely. In Germany the Bundestag and 
the Bundesrat voted with a high majority for the German Act Approving the 
Treaty of Lisbon and the accompanying laws to this act, in contrast to the situa-
tion in the Czech Republic. Here, the case was first brought to court before the 
parliament had actually voted on the ratification issue.2 In the end, however, 
                                                 
1  For example in Latvia the complainant required from the constitutional court a ruling 
in favour of a referendum. However, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lat-
via ruled in favour of the Lisbon Treaty, in their view a referendum was not required 
by the constitution. Furthermore, as is well-known, also the Irish finally endorsed the 
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in their second referendum on 2 October this year. 
2  Piotr Maciej Kaczyński, Sebastian Kurpas, and Peadar ó Broin, ‘Ratification of the 
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both courts unanimously3 decided this issue affirmatively.  
In this paper, the first judgement of the CCC4 and the GCC judgement will 
be compared, especially those parts that deal with the different views of the 
courts regarding the European integration process. It is argued below that the 
CCC understanding of sovereignty and judicial control does unlike the GCC 
judgement justice to this process. The paper starts with the judgement of the 
CCC because this decision ‘drew a strong and explicit inspiration from judge-
ments [Maastricht and Solange II] of the German Federal Constitutional 
Court’5. Also, this ruling came out first. 
2. The Ruling of the Czech Constitutional Court 
The first judgement of the CCC was unanimously adopted on 26 November 
2008. In the operative part of the judgement it is stated ‘that the Treaty of Lis-
bon […] and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union are not 
inconsistent with the constitutional order’6. The first ruling was not the final 
say of the court. The court only reviewed those provisions that were contested 
by the parties, not the whole treaty. Thus, the ruling outlined below is no final 
proof of compatibility with the Czech constitutional order. However, in the 
second judgement, adopted on 3 November 2009, the CCC ruled unanimously 
that the Treaty of Lisbon, and the ratification of it, does not contravene the 
constitutional order. 
For the question of whether a treaty is in conformity with the constitution, 
special review ability is laid down in Art. 87 (2) of the Czech constitution.7 In 
accordance with this procedure, the court’s review primarily focused on three 
                                                                                                                                                      
Lisbon Treaty: Ireland is not the only problem’, European Policy Institutes Network 
Working Paper No. 18 (2008), 1-12, 7 ff. 
3  The GCC judgement was ruled unanimously as regards the result; by seven votes to 
one as regards the reasoning. 
4  The paper also includes some remarks about the second judgement adopted on 3 No-
vember 2009 file no. Pl. ÚS 29/09. Unfortunately, the English translation of the judge-
ment was not available before this paper was handed in. 
5  Petr Bříza, ‘The Czech Republic: The Constitutional Court on the Lisbon Treaty Decision 
of 26 November 2008’, European Constitutional Law Review (2009), 143-164, 164.  
6  Para 218 of the judgement Pl. ÚS 19/08.The English version of the judgement is avail-
able at: <http://angl.concourt.cz/angl_verze/doc/pl-19-08.php>. 
7  Prior to the ratification of a treaty under Article 10a or Article 49, the Constitutional 
Court shall further have jurisdiction to decide concerning the treaty’s conformity with 
the constitutional order. A treaty may not be ratified prior to the Constitutional Court 
giving judgement. 
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Articles of the constitution, namely Article 1 (1)8, Article 10a (1)9, and Article 
9 paras 2 and 310. There are three parts of the judgement in which the court 
took up a position on the integration process. Firstly the court deals with the 
question of gaining or losing sovereignty by being part of the European Union 
(a). Secondly the question regarding the barriers of competence transfer is con-
sidered (b). Lastly the competence of ultimate judicial control is outlined (c). 
a) Sovereignty 
The part of the judgement that deals with the question whether the Czech Re-
public loses its status as a sovereign state through the ratification of the Treaty 
of Lisbon starts with the experiment to describe sovereignty. The court first ar-
rived at the conclusion that  
it is also possible to observe in a sovereign the freedom to restrict itself by the 
legal order or by freely accepted international obligations, in other words, the 
ability to regulate its competences (Jellinek, J. op. cit., p. 524). We can con-
clude from this that the possibility to create this free will that a state has to re-
peatedly amend a particular competence is not a sign of a sovereign’s inade-
quacy, but of its full sovereignty.11 
From this the court concluded for the integration process that the 
character of integration, in this regard also in the case of the European Union, 
can ultimately lead to protection and strengthening of the sovereignty of mem-
ber states vis-à-vis external, especially geopolitical and economic factors; for 
example, also vis-à-vis newly emerging world superpowers, where it is diffi-
cult to guess the future priority of values to which they will be willing to sub-
ordinate the building of a new order in the globalized world.12  
Furthermore, the court pointed out that in special areas the state can no longer 
act efficiently on its own. Additionally, the need for a strong European Union 
is expressed by the court: 
It is an existential interest of the integrating European civilization to appear in 
                                                 
8  The Czech Republic is a sovereign, unitary and democratic, law-abiding State, based 
on respect for the rights and freedoms of man and citizen. 
9  An international agreement may provide for a transfer of certain powers of bodies of 
the Czech Republic to an international organization or institution. 
10  (2) The substantive requisites of the democratic, law-abiding State may not be 
amended. (3) Interpretation of legal rules may not be used as authorization to elimi-
nate or imperil the foundations of the democratic State. 
11  Para 100 of the judgement Pl. ÚS 19/08.  
12  Para 102 of the judgement Pl. ÚS 19/08. 
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global competition as an important and respected force.13 
In sum, the CCC highlighted the benefits of the European integration process 
in a globalized world. It decided that the Czech Republic will not lose its status 
as a sovereign entity if it ratifies the Lisbon Treaty. 
b) Competence transfer 
What limits on transfers of competence are laid down in the judgement? Or 
when does the CCC see the Czech Republic as losing its sovereign status? 
First, the Court states that a transfer of sovereign powers would be prohibited 
if it led to the abolition of the Czech Republic as a sovereign entity. Thus, the 
transfer of the competence to decide on its own competence (Kompetenz-
Kompetenz) is prohibited. Second, the court held that every transfer of compe-
tences needs a clear ‘delimitation’ of the transferred powers. The rules in 
which the transfer is laid down have to be definite and recognizable and they 
must enable the political organs of the Czech Republic to predict as far as pos-
sible the degree to which competences are actually transferred.14 
The only material restriction for any transfer of competences to another po-
litical and legal level that can be found in the ruling is this: 
These limits should be left primarily to the legislature to specify, because this 
is a priori a political question, which provides the legislature wide discre-
tion; interference by the Constitutional Court should come into consideration 
as ultima ratio, i.e., in a situation where the scope of discretion was clearly 
exceeded, and Art. 1 par. 1 of the Constitution was affected, because there 
was a transfer of powers beyond the scope of Art. 10a of the Constitution. An 
analogous approach was taken by the Polish Constitutional Tribunal in its de-
cision on the constitutionality of Poland’s accession to the EU, of 11 May 
2005 (see judgment K 18/04, OTK ZU (2005) ser. A, nr. 5, pol. 49)15 [em-
phasis added]. 
Here, the court grants the legislature a wide room for manoeuvre. For further 
steps in the European integration process the Czech government has the possi-
bility to create this process, although the last word lies with the court. Fur-
thermore, with this statement the court expressed confidence not only in the 
European project but also in its own government. 
                                                 
13  Para 105 of the judgement Pl. ÚS 19/08. 
14  Bříza, note 5 above, 152. 
15  Para 109 of the judgement Pl. ÚS 19/08. 
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c) Judicial control 
Judicial control can be executed on two different levels. The first level con-
cerns the question whether a European act is covered by the European compe-
tence catalogue or whether it is outside the competences of the EU. In the latter 
case such an act is a so called ‘ultra-vires’ act. Regarding the judicial control 
of ‘ultra-vires’ acts the CCC stated that such a control ‘is more in the nature of 
a potential warning, but need not ever be used in practice’16. Secondly the ju-
dicial control regarding human rights protection was brought up by the court. 
Here, the court repeated its findings from the Sugar Quotas case17 which stated 
that if  
‘the standard of protection ensured in the European Union were unsuitable, 
the bodies of the Czech Republic would have to again take over the trans-
ferred powers, in order to ensure that it was observed’18.  
Here, the court continued the GCC ‘solange’ jurisprudence. 
3. The Judgement of the German Federal Constitutional 
Court 
Unlike the judgement of the CCC, the decision of the GCC from 30 June 
200919 is the final say, at least regarding the question of the Lisbon Treaty’s 
compatibility with German Basic Law. The scope of review of the GCC fo-
cused on Article 38 (1) sentence 120, Article 79 (3)21 and Article 20 (1) and 
(2)22 of the German Basic Law. The court stated that  
the right to vote establishes a right to democratic self-determination, to free 
                                                 
16  Para 139 of the judgement Pl. ÚS 19/08. 
17  Judgment Pl. ÚS 50/04 of 8 March 2006. The English version of the judgement is 
available at: <http://angl.concourt.cz/angl_verze/doc/p-50-04.php>.  
18  Para 196 of the judgement. 
19  The English version of the judgement No 2 BvE 2/08 is available at: 
<https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208
en.html>. 
20  Members of the German Bundestag shall be elected in general, direct, free, equal, and 
secret elections. 
21  Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into Länder, 
their participation on principle in the legislative process, or the principles laid down in 
Articles 1 and 20 shall be inadmissible. 
22  The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state. (2) All state 
authority is derived from the people. It shall be exercised by the people through elec-
tions and other votes and through specific legislative, executive, and judicial bodies. 
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and equal participation in the state authority exercised in Germany and to 
compliance with the principle of democracy including the respect of the con-
stituent power of the people.23 
Unlike in the Czech constitution, no special review clause for European or in-
ternational treaties exists in the German Basic Law or in the Federal Constitu-
tional Court Act (Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz – BVerfGG). Therefore, the 
Court acted in response to an Organstreit proceeding24 and to constitutional 
complaints. 
a) The German sovereignty 
The GCC’s understanding of sovereignty differs from that of its Czech coun-
terpart. Where the CCC emphasized the goal of efficient governance and a 
strong player within the global sphere, the GCC is much more reluctant. 
Mainly it highlighted the task of the EU to keep peace in Europe. For example 
the GCC stated that 
the Basic Law wants the participation of Germany in international organisa-
tions, an order of mutual peaceful balancing of interests that is established be-
tween the states and organised cooperation in Europe.25 
However, as an aside the court also mentions that the integration in the Euro-
pean Union ‘strengthens the possibilities of shaping policy by joint coordi-
nated action’26. One paragraph later the court emphasizes the national auton-
omy by stating that  
[d]emocratic constitutional states can gain a formative influence on an in-
creasingly mobile society, which is increasingly linked across borders, only 
by sensible cooperation which takes account of their own interest as well as 
of their common interest [emphasis added].  
In the end, the GCC comes to a conclusion similar to that of the CCC. While 
an abandonment of Germany’s sovereignty is prohibited by German Basic 
Law, the Treaty of Lisbon can be legally ratified as it does not establish a fed-
eral European state. Though, the perspective regarding the European integra-
tion is less enthusiastic and always emphasises the retention of national auton-
omy spheres. 
                                                 
23  Para 208 of the judgement No 2 BvE 2/08. 
24  This proceeding was only ‘admissible to the extent that the applicant asserts a viola-
tion of the competences of the German Bundestag decide on the deployment of the 
German armed forces’ (para 167 of the judgement No 2 BvE 2/08).  
25  Para 222 of the judgement No 2 BvE 2/08. 
26  Para 220 of the judgement No 2 BvE 2/08. 
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b) Competence transfer 
At first glance the restrictions formulated by the GCC for a transfer of compe-
tences are similar to those laid down in the CCC’s judgement. A transfer of the 
competence to decide on its own competence (Kompetenz-Kompetenz), the 
GCC states, would be prohibited.27 Furthermore, the rules for the transfer have 
to be precise.28 Another restriction laid down in the judgement is that the 
member states must retain ‘sufficient space for the political formation of the 
economic, cultural and social circumstances of life’29. However, in the next 
step of the ruling the GCC goes more into detail when discussing those politi-
cal decisions that, in its view, have to be decided by the German parliament. In 
doing so, the court lays down some rigid material boundaries for further Euro-
pean integration. The GCC names five issue areas in which the exclusive com-
petence has to remain at the national level: 
(1) citizenship, 
(2) civil and the military monopoly on the use of force,  
(3) revenue and expenditure, including external financing, 
(4) all elements of encroachment that are decisive for the realisation of funda-
mental rights, above all as regards intensive encroachments on fundamental 
rights (such as the deprivation of liberty in the administration of criminal 
law or the placement in an institution),  
(5) cultural issues such as the disposition of language, the shaping of circum-
stances concerning the family and education, the ordering of the freedom of 
opinion, of the press and of association and the dealing with faith or ideology. 
c) Judicial review 
Like the CCC the GCC reiterated the above-explained ultra-vires review30. 
Yet, the GCC gives this review possibility not the status of a potential warning, 
but elaborates the consequences of such a review, namely that this ‘can result 
in Community law or Union law being declared inapplicable in Germany’. 
Regarding the fundamental rights jurisdiction the GCC repeated its ‘solange 
doctrine’ to which also the CCC referred in their judgement: 
The Federal Constitutional Court no longer exercises its jurisdiction to decide 
                                                 
27  Para 233 of the judgement No 2 BvE 2/08. 
28  Para 236 of the judgement No 2 BvE 2/08. 
29  Para 249 of the judgement No 2 BvE 2/08. 
30  Paras 240 ff. of the judgement No 2 BvE 2/08. 
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on the applicability of secondary Union law and other acts of the European 
Union […] merely as long as the European Union guarantees an application of 
fundamental rights which in substance and effectiveness is essentially similar 
to the protection of fundamental rights required unconditionally by the Basic 
Law.31 
4. Conclusion 
The perspectives of both courts towards the European integration process dif-
fer highly. The GCC is quite reluctant and upholds the flag of national auton-
omy. In the decision an undertone can be found saying ‘integration, but’, espe-
cially when it comes to the barriers for competence transfer. In the view of the 
CCC, however, the European integration process is an opportunity for the 
Czech Republic to gain power in the globalized world. 
In my view, the GCC should have read the decision of the CCC more inten-
sively and, at least in some parts, should have adopted the same course. The 
rigid and negative glance at the Lisbon treaty has misled the GCC sometimes 
and has narrowed its view for interpretation possibilities beforehand. For ex-
ample, the definition of issue areas that have to be retained at the national 
level: here, unlike the very open interpretation of the CCC, the GCC chooses a 
too rigid interpretation. The wide discretion of the CCC’s interpretation com-
bined with an ultima-ratio control function for the judiciary is more in line 
with the previous decisions (Solange I, II and Maastricht) of the GCC. Fur-
thermore, the CCC’s course gives this court the possibility to participate ac-
tively in the integration process. The rigid decision of the GCC gives the Ger-
man courts and government less space for such participation. Firstly, because 
by laying down those five areas the court curtailed its own possibility to de-
velop other areas or issues that have to remain at the national level. The threat 
of the ultima-ratio control for other areas is no longer an active threat. Sec-
ondly, a good threat is a threat that does not have to be put into action. If a 
threat is carried out, like in this case, this means that it has been unsuccessful. 
In finally executing its longstanding Solange threat, the GCC has spent almost 
all of its ammunition. Thirdly, these five areas will stand in the way of the 
GCC in later cases in which the determination of the European integration 
process is discussed. Fourthly, it is quite questionable whether the GCC’s cata-
logue of national competences can, today and even more so in the future, be 
dealt with at the national level only. 
In addition by deducing the above-cited five areas of the so-called eternity 
                                                 
31  Para 191 of the judgement No 2 BvE 2/08. 
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guarantee in Article 79 (3) of the German basic law, the GCC also goes a step 
too far in a different regard. With this determination it crosses the boundary of 
the competence to develop the law by judicial interpretation. In a first step, the 
GCC invokes the rather broad right of self-determination, only to curtail then 
this right by establishing its rigid catalogue of boundaries. 
Interestingly, the part mentioning the five areas in the GCC judgement was 
cited by the Czech senators in the second submission to the CCC. These areas 
were declared as the ‘untouchable’ national domain. A transfer of such compe-
tences therefore interferes with a ‘core sovereignty’ area. Unlike the GCC the 
senators were of the opinion that some of these competences would be trans-
ferred to the European level by ratifying the Lisbon Treaty.32 Thus, it’s inter-
esting to have a look at the English translation of the judgement and the court’s 
response to this opinion. 
 
                                                 
32  Ivo Slosarcik, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon & the Czech Constitutional Court: Act II’, CEPS 
Policy Brief (2009), 1-4, 3.  
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Disappointment, Some Satisfaction, and a Little Bit of Hope:  
On the Social Content of the Lisbon Ruling 
Martin Höpner  
The complex Lisbon ruling by the German Constitutional Court (GCC) can be 
assessed from a number of viewpoints. I shall take a politico-economic per-
spective, by which I mean the implications for the ability of democratic poli-
ties to reach agreement on market-correcting measures, to implement them, 
and to keep them stable. It is not surprising that the deepening of European in-
tegration does not leave this ability untouched. 
Social regulation, in the wider sense in which I use the term, encompasses 
various kinds of market-restricting policies, including not only the regulation 
of social insurance, but also, for example, labour law, the ability to levy taxes 
to finance the welfare state, or the ability to organize certain economic sectors 
on the basis of principles other than those of pure competition. These different 
instances of ‘creative leeway’ emerged in specific historical circumstances and 
were always subject to political contestation. Liberal economists have tradi-
tionally declared themselves in favour of removing such leeway from the de-
mocratic toolbox. Hayek, in particular, pinned his hopes of stemming such 
regulations on European integration.1 In this context, my worries relate to a 
number of rulings by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) which – often sur-
prisingly, because they were neither foreseen nor intended by member states – 
declared that national regulations amounted to unjustified restrictions on Inter-
nal Market freedoms, without there being any realistic possibility of political 
re-regulation at the European level.  
In what follows, I shall show why I consider the social regulation assertions 
of the Lisbon ruling inadequate; why the social regulation implications of the 
ruling are, however, a step in the right direction; and why these implications 
may in no way substitute for a solution of the underlying problems.  
1. Disappointment Concerning the Treatment of Social  
Policy Problems 
Among the subjects of both the Gauweiler suit and the suit of the Left Party was 
improper restrictions imposed on social regulation by European bodies and, in 
                                                 
1  Friedrich A. Hayek, Individualism and Economic order, Chicago/London 1948, Ch. 12. 
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particular, by the ECJ’s expansive interpretation of the basic freedoms (free 
movement of persons, goods, capital and services). For example, the authors of 
the Gauweiler suit alleged that the ECJ has ‘unleashed a deregulation dynamic 
which promotes marketization at the expense of social justice’.2 As might have 
been expected, given the hearing in Karlsruhe on 10-11 February 2009, the Lis-
bon ruling deals with social policy problems within an extremely confined 
space.3 In its ruling, the Court is uncompromisingly following the argumenta-
tion of Franz Mayer, who represented the Bundestag in the negotiations.4 The 
judges in Karlsruhe referred to the numerous mentions of ‘social’ in the treaties, 
protocols and non-binding integration policy declarations, ranging from the ob-
ligation to promote ‘economic and social progress’ in the Preamble of the Treaty 
to the explicit mention of ‘the social function of sport’ in Art. 165, para. 2 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (both at para. 396 of the rul-
ing): where so much attention is paid to the social, how can there exist a social 
deficit? In addition, the Court declared that the ECJ ‘has developed principles in 
its case law which strengthen the social dimension of the European Union’ and 
has even established ‘a European fundamental right to strike’.5 As a result, 
‘there is nothing to indicate’ that the member states have been deprived of ‘prac-
tical means of action’ with regard to social matters.6  
Sadly, the Court falls short of an analysis of the consequences of European 
market-creating integration for the social correction of capitalism. The heart of 
the problem lies in a highly effective reversal of the principle of subsidiarity, 
which has emerged from ECJ case law on the nature and scope of the basic 
freedoms. In applying the principles developed in the rulings in Dassonville 
and Cassis de Dijon,7 the ECJ puts market-restricting rules on an institutional-
ized defensive, even if they apply without discrimination and equally to nation-
als and foreigners alike. In the ECJ’s expansive interpretation, every regulation 
which could make the exercise of one of the basic freedoms less attractive 
constitutes an instance of restriction. Since the Gebhard ruling,8 a four-stage 
test has been applied uniformly to all four freedoms: limitations on the basic 
freedoms are permissible only if they are justified on the basis of – narrowly 
defined – compelling reasons of general interest; if they are applied in a non-
                                                 
2  GCC, para 269. 
3  See, in particular, the eight recitals GCC, paras 392 ff. 
4  Cf. Franz C. Mayer, ‘Der EuGH als Feind? Die Debatte um das soziale Europa in der 
europäischen Rechtsprechung’, Integration 32 (2009), 246-265. 
5  Both at GCC, para 398. 
6  GCC, para 399. 
7  ECJ, Dassonville, C-8/74 and Cassis de Dijon, C-120/78. 
8  ECJ, Gebhard, C-55/94. 
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discriminatory fashion; if they are suitable for securing the attainment of the 
objective pursued; and if they do not go beyond what is necessary to attain the 
objectives.9 
In parallel with this, the ECJ has continued to develop another line of case 
law: the horizontal effect of the basic freedoms on private parties (for the first 
time in Defrenne II).10 One of the highlights of this case law so far is the Laval 
ruling (C-341/05)11, which prohibited Swedish trade unions from interfering 
with the exercise of one of the basic freedoms through collective action, if such 
action does not meet the four test criteria of the Gebhard ruling.12 What con-
cerns me here is the practical constriction of democratic scope of action pre-
cisely in the sensitive area of the political definition of the limits of the market. 
Even when national laws (or the actions of private citizens) meet the criteria of 
the Gebhard formula, the constellation must not be confused with sovereignty 
(or, less pathetically: autonomy). Sovereignty means being able to decide for 
oneself whether a measure which sets limits on the market, and which, in ac-
cordance with the European treaties, lies in the exclusive competence of the 
member states, shall stand, without having to justify its existence before the 
European Court of Justice. The most recent expansive interpretations of the ba-
sic freedoms are therefore, to put it bluntly, declarations of war on regulated 
capitalism – a realization which has not yet dawned on German politicians 
(apart from a few exceptions) and which has found its way into the trade union 
debate on Europe only recently and very gradually.  
2. Hopes Concerning the Effectiveness of the Identity and  
Ultra-Vires Reviews  
The Lisbon ruling does not represent an adequate response to this problem. 
Nevertheless, some of its contents may be suitable for putting a stop to the 
overinterpretation of the scope of the basic freedoms. I shall illustrate this in 
terms of a particular market-limiting institution, namely German codetermina-
tion at the supervisory-board level of large companies.  
With its rulings in Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art,13 the ECJ de facto 
                                                 
9  See para 37 of the Gebhard ruling. 
10  ECJ, Defrenne II, C-43/75. 
11  ECJ, Laval, C-341/05. 
12  For more detail, see Christian Joerges and Florian Rödl, ‘Informal Politics, Formalised 
Law and the “Social Deficit” of European Integration: Reflections after the Judgments 
of the ECJ in Viking and Laval’, European Law Journal 15 (2009), 1-19. 
13  ECJ, Centros, C-212/97; Überseering, C-208/00; Inspire Art, 167/01. 
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transformed company codetermination from a mandatory into an optional insti-
tution. Making reference to potential obstacles to freedom of establishment, the 
Court granted foreign letterbox companies the protection of European law: 
member states must put up with foreign company legal forms on their territory, 
even if they do not engage in any economic activity in the place they are 
founded (imposing the option of company-law shopping). At the same time, 
with Commission v. Portugal a series of ECJ rulings commenced with which 
the Court,14 with reference to potential obstacles to free movement of capital, 
proceeded against so-called ‘golden shares’ (special voting rights for adminis-
trative bodies at general meetings or restrictions on voting rights with compa-
rable effect). Such special voting rights, according to the European Court, have 
the potential to deter foreign investors. In this way, the ECJ has subjected 
stock corporation and company law, which in actual fact belongs to the exclu-
sive competences of the member states, to the scrutiny of European law.  
At the time of writing, it is expected that a case concerning the right to 
mandate supervisory board members will be brought before the ECJ.15 Spe-
cifically, what is at issue is the right of the Krupp-Stiftung, laid down in the 
statutes of ThyssenKrupp, to mandate three representatives to the company’s 
supervisory board. Since neither the ten seats of the employees’ side nor the 
three seats of the Krupp-Stiftung can be supplanted in the event of a takeover, 
the ECJ may discern a restriction on free movement of capital here (because, in 
effect, the disputed regulation could make the acquisition of shares in the com-
pany less attractive). From here it would be merely a short step to a ruling 
against the German Codetermination Act of 1976. A restriction on free move-
ment of capital by means of company codetermination would undoubtedly be 
approved. The ECJ would, in all probability, acknowledge employee protec-
tion as a compelling reason in the general interest. How the Court would rule 
on the proportionality of the measure, in contrast, remains an entirely open 
question, since international comparison shows that considerably more modest 
provisions on employee codetermination are sufficient to ensure consultation 
and social peace.  
In short, an ECJ ruling against German codetermination is a hypothetical 
but, based on the ECJ’s interpretation of the internal market freedoms, possible 
outcome (which, in my opinion, perfectly illustrates how dubious this interpre-
tation is).16 The added value of the Lisbon ruling lies in the fact that the Ger-
                                                 
14  ECJ, Commission v. Portugal, C-483/99. 
15  For details, see Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 30 September 2009, 23. 
16  A cynic would add: The Court could, in the same ruling, even establish a European 
fundamental right of employee consultation, whose exercise must, of course, comply 
with internal market regulations. Precisely this happened in the rulings on Viking (C-
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man Constitutional Court would have to judge such an ECJ ruling to be inap-
plicable. Both the identity review developed in the ruling and the ultra-vires 
review, with which the German Constitutional Court defines limits of the su-
premacy of European law over national law, could apply in the case of an anti-
codetermination ruling of the ECJ. It is in this respect, not in the closer in-
volvement of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat in the realization of European 
legal acts urged by the Court, that I see the decisive and long-term innovation 
of the Lisbon ruling.  
3. A Defensive Reaction – Not a Solution to the Problem 
The Lisbon ruling is far from being able to provide a solution to the social and 
democratic problems of European integration or even from wanting to do so. 
The causes of the asymmetry between negative and positive integration are of 
a structural, political-economic and political nature and cannot be disposed of 
either by this or by another Constitutional Court ruling.17 That applies in par-
ticular to the positive integration, blocked at European level, which – in con-
trast to negative integration – cannot be accelerated by court rulings.  
The instruments developed in the Lisbon ruling are suitable, at best, for use 
against specific, selected outcomes of ‘integration by law’. In the case of an 
ECJ ruling directed against codetermination, the identity review and the ultra-
vires review may take effect. In contrast, they would not take effect in cases in 
which ECJ rulings affect the relevant institutions merely indirectly, but never-
theless transformatively. The same holds true in cases in which reinterpretation 
of law takes place not by means of a ‘big bang’, but through slow steps, occur-
ring over long periods. For example, the ECJ’s extraordinarily restrictive tax-
law rulings, in which the Court has, step by step, declared attempts to stem in-
ternational tax arbitrage to be violations of Internal Market freedoms,18 may, 
in the end, produce as much economic liberalization as Centros and Laval, be-
cause they systematically narrow the revenue base of welfare states.19 Pre-
                                                                                                                                                      
438/05) and Laval, in which the right to strike was elevated to a European fundamen-
tal right, although the core of the rulings consisted in the prohibition of unjustified in-
terference with internal market freedoms through collective action. Compare, in this 
connection, the German Constitutional Court’s comment at recital 398 of the Lisbon 
ruling that, in Viking, the ECJ had ‘even’ established the existence of a fundamental 
right to strike.  
17  See Fritz W. Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? Oxford/New 
York 1999, Ch. 2. 
18  For example in: ECJ, Marks and Spencer, C-446/03. 
19  Steffen Ganghof and Philipp Genschel, ‘Taxation and Democracy in the EU’, MPIfG 
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sumably they would not be cases for identity or ultra-vires reviews.  
The Constitutional Court also declares that, although it discerns potential 
ultra-vires problems, it sees no manifest ones.20 Therefore, where the horse has 
already bolted – as, for example, with the prohibition on the application of the 
‘real seat theory’ in company law (Centros) – the Lisbon ruling will do nothing 
to change the status quo. In these instances, corrections can only be imposed 
politically and in conflict with Brussels and Luxembourg.  
I assume that the Constitutional Court will follow up its words with actions; 
that is, there will be rulings which declare Community law to be inapplicable. 
We must wait and see, with some anticipation, whether these rulings will also 
touch on the scope of the Internal Market freedoms – and how they will look, 
in detail. Do national regulations really violate European law if they have no 
apparent transnational implications? Does a national regulation impinge on the 
basic freedoms even if its restrictive effect is merely hypothetical? Has it really 
been the intention of the member states to subject collective action by trade un-
ions and employers’ organizations to the test of proportionality? If the Consti-
tutional Court makes good on its words, appropriate case law will have to be 
developed on this and similar questions.  
The tenor of reactions to the Lisbon ruling is rather critical. In my contribu-
tion, I have emphasized why I consider some objections by the Court to be jus-
tified and urgently necessary. Is there not the danger that the Constitutional 
Courts of other EU countries will react with similar rulings and that, as a re-
sult, European law becomes a patchwork? This objection has some substance. 
In fact, the Lisbon ruling may herald a process of certain country-specific dif-
ferentiation with regard to European law. This will not bring the Community to 
its knees. Non-application of European legal acts and rulings is likely to re-
main a rare exception and will primarily serve as a warning shot against future 
attempts to shift competences on the basis of case law. A certain loosening of 
the principle of uniform national application of European law seems to me the 
lesser evil in comparison to the unrestrained overinterpretation of European 
basic freedoms and the resulting Hayekian competition state, stripped of the 
power to shape the economy. Any fair assessment of the Lisbon ruling must 
take into account that the underlying problem was not caused by the Constitu-
tional Court.  
 
                                                                                                                                                      
Discussion Paper 2007/2, Cologne 2007. 
20  Cf., for example, the Court’s formulation at para 238. 
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The Lisbon Judgment, Germany’s Sozialstaat, the ECJ’s  
Labour-Law Jurisprudence, and the Reconceptualisation of 
European Law as a New Type of Conflicts Law 
Christian Joerges 
When the idea of a workshop on the Lisbon judgment of the German Constitu-
tional Court (GCC)1 with Ph.D. researchers of the Bremen International 
Graduate School of Social Sciences was put forward, it seemed to us that a 
date after the summer break and before the new academic year would still pro-
vide a spontaneous and speedy reaction. So we thought. But we were wrong. 
The German Law Journal had, in its issue of August already published no less 
than nine case notes, some short, most of them thorough and comprehensive,2 
and since then many more have become available. The great number of players 
in this concert of voices should have been foreseeable. The dominating tone, 
however, less so. After a very brief phase of quite positive responses, the wind 
has changed. Germany’s most prestigious court experiences a nearly collective 
badmouthing.3 Surprisingly though, J.H.H. Weiler, not particularly respectful 
in his comments on the, to date, most famous pertinent German judgment,4 
dissented. ‘A decision with lights and shadows’, he opined.5 If Weiler’s moni-
tum has its fundamentum in re, the timing of the seminar in Bremen may have 
been unfortunate; its format, however, was not. Comments, it was decided, 
should remain brief and stay away from any comprehensive evaluation. The 
                                                 
1  GCC, judgment of 30.6.2009, available at: www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de; pre-
liminary English translation: http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidun 
gen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html>. 
2  German Law Journal 10:8 (2009), Special Section: The Federal Constitutional Court’s 
Lisbon Case; available at <http://www.germanlawjournal.com>. 
3  Most telling probably <http://verfassungsblog.de/2009/08/08/hochrangige-juristen-
fordern-fesseln-fur-karlsruhe/>. 
4  See J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Does Europe Need a Constitution? Reflections on Demos, Telos 
and the German Maastricht Decision’, European Law Journal 1 (1995), 219 ff., (also 
in Olaf Due/Marcus Lutter/Jürgen Schwarze (eds), Festschrift für Ulrich Everling, 
Band 2, Baden-Baden 1995, 1651 ff.). 
5  J.H.H Weiler, ‘Editorial. The “Lisbon Urteil” and the Fast Food Culture’, European 
Journal of International Law 20 (2009), 505-509; the passage cited continues with a 
generalising harsh critique of the court’s many critics: ‘A decision with lights and 
shadows… The real significance of the Lisbon Urteil will have to wait for much more 
careful analysis than that to which we have been treated so far’ – ‘Can you please sub-
stantiate?’ one is inclined to ask back: ‘Isn’t an argument good or bad rather than fast 
or slow?’ 
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following remarks will comply with this recommendation and present a brief 
and partial comment, albeit against the background of more complex, if not 
ambitious, theoretical premises. We will proceed in three steps, namely, first, a 
reconstruction of the conflicts-law elements to be found in the judgment (I), 
second, a critique of the recent ECJ labour-law jurisprudence which seeks to 
show why and how the conflicts-law approach could contribute to a defence of 
the welfare traditions of ‘Old Europe’ in general, and Germany’s Sozialstaat in 
particular (II), and, third, a critique of the passages on social Europe in the 
Lisbon Judgment (III). 
1. Contesting Commitments: Conflicts-Law Dimensions in 
the Lisbon Judgment 
The focus of the remarks in these comments is announced in the title. This title 
mirrors a concern with the economic prerogatives of the European project, the 
irresistible embedding of market-building in regulatory politics and its remain-
ing ‘social deficit’,6 which has come to the fore with particular clarity in the 
ECJ’s recent jurisprudence on the supremacy of primary and secondary Euro-
pean law over national labour law.7 The long title also alludes to the sugges-
tion that the understanding of European law as a new type of conflicts law may 
provide constructive responses to these difficulties.8 
                                                 
6  Ever since Christian Joerges, ‘Markt ohne Staat? Die Wirtschaftsverfassung der Ge-
meinschaft und die regulative Politik’, in Rudolf Wildenmann (ed), Staatswerdung 
Europas? Optionen einer Europäischen Union, Baden-Baden 1991, 225-268 [‘The 
Market without a State? States without Markets? Two Essays on the Law of the Euro-
pean Economy’, EUI Working Paper Law 1/96, San Domenico di Fiesole 1996 
(<http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997-019 and -020.htm>)] up until idem, ‘Sozialstaat-
lichkeit in Europe? A Conflict-of-Laws Approach to the Law of the EU and the Pro-
ceduralisation of Constitutionalisation’, German Law Journal  10:2 (2009), 336-360. 
7  Christian Joerges/Florian Rödl, ‘Informal Politics, Formalised Law and the “Social 
Deficit” of European Integration: Reflections after the Judgments of the ECJ in Viking 
and Laval’, European Law Journal 15 (2009), 1-19. 
 8  See Christian Joerges, ‘Rethinking European Law’s Supremacy: A Plea for a Suprana-
tional Conflict of Laws’, in Beate Kohler-Koch/Berthold Rittberger (eds), Debating 
the Democratic Legitimacy of the European Union, Lanham MD 2007, 311-327; 
idem, ‘Integration through Conflicts Law: On the Defence of the European Project by 
means of alternative conceptualisation of legal constitutionalisation’, in Rainer Nickel 
(ed), Conflict of Laws and Laws of Conflict in Europe and Beyond – Patterns of Su-
pranational and Transnational Juridification, Oslo, RECON Report No. 7 (2009), 531-
560, available at: <http://www.reconproject.eu/projectweb/portalproject/Report7_ 
ConflictOfLaws.html>. 
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What should the judgment of the GCC have to do with all these sugges-
tions?9 A first and preliminary response to this question can be derived from 
underlining the court’s insistence of the interpretation of the Community as a 
non-hierarchical Staatenverbund. The ‘values codified in Article 2 TEU Lis-
bon, … may in the case of a conflict of laws not claim primacy over the consti-
tutional identity of the Member States…’.10 This is in sharp contrast with 
Germany’s federal order, within which federal law takes 
precedence over conflicting Land law. … European law does not affect the 
claim to validity of conflicting law in the Member States; it only forces it back 
as regards its application to the extent required by the Treaties and permitted 
by them pursuant to the order to apply the law given nationally by the Act ap-
proving the Treaty….11 
It follows from the ‘the obligation under European law to respect the constitu-
ent power of the Member States as the masters of the Treaties’ that there can 
be no kompetenz-kompetenz of the ECJ to determine unilaterally whether the 
principle of enumerated powers has been respected.12 ‘The ultra vires review 
as well as the identity review can result in Community law or Union law being 
declared inapplicable in Germany…’.13 
In these passages, the Court re-iterates, modifies and refines its earlier ju-
risprudence. They may, therefore, be both interpreted and criticised as a con-
tinuation of ‘la guerre de juges’ diagnosed by many observers.14 One should 
not take them too seriously, however. Our Constitutional Court has, to cite 
                                                 
9  It is as unsurprising as it is unimportant that the conceptual apparatus of conflict of 
laws is not consciously used. Pertinent queries are nevertheless unavoidable and at 
times very visible, albeit much more clearly than in the judgment itself in a post-
judgment comment by the Court’s Vice-President Andreas Voßkuhle, Der europäische 
Verfassungsgerichtsverbund, TranState Arbeitspapiere: 2009 No. 106 (available at 
<http://www.sfb597.uni-bremen.de/>): Voßkuhle addresses the – potentially conflict-
ual! (at pp. 9, 14) – co-existence of courts with different, albeit overlapping, constiti-
tutional functions, rejects explicitly the idea of some comprehensive supremacy of one 
in the trias (at pp.2, 15) and seeks for an ordo among them. He identifies guiding 
principles – including a constitutional ordre public (at p. 17)! – as well as the need for 
an interactive adjudication (at p. 10) – all of this is precisely what a law of conflict 
resolution is all about.  
10  GCC, para 332. 
11  GCC, para 335. 
12  GCC, para 235. 
13  GCC, para 241. 
14  See, for example, Monica Claes, The National Courts’ Mandate in the European 
Constitution, Oxford 2006, 452 ff.; comprehensively, Franz C. Mayer, Kompetenz-
überschreitung und Letztentscheidung, Munich, 2001, passim. 
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J.H.H. Weiler again, in ‘its internationally-related case law (…) a well-earned 
reputation of the Dog that Barks but does not Bite’.15 This reading, however, 
does not capture a deeper level of the Court’s reasoning, which Damian 
Chalmers has identified.16 There are, indeed, as Chalmers has rightly under-
lined, two distinct lines of argument in the Court’s reasoning: 
One is the defence of constitutional democracy as institutionalised at na-
tional level. In the case of Germany, the principle of democratic self-rule is en-
shrined in Article 38 of the Basic Law and protected by the eternity clause of 
Article 79 (3).17 In its explanations of the democratic principle, the Court uses 
the somewhat cumbersome language of German constitutional doctrine.18 And 
yet, if one seeks to identify potential social-philosophical underpinnings of its 
pronouncements, one will find them informed by, at any rate compatible with, 
Kantian and Habermasian premises: Those subject to the law must be able to 
understand themselves as its authors. This type of reconstruction finds addi-
tional support in the anchoring of the right to democratic vote in human dig-
nity,19 and the later much-criticised passages on the derivative authority of the 
Union,20 on the ‘one-man-one-vote’ principle,21 and on the Sozialstaatsgebot 
to which Section II will return. 
The second, conflicting reasoning postulates a commitment to European in-
tegration. This commitment, so the Lisbon Court finds, is enshrined in Article 
23 of the Basic Law.22 The imposition of a duty of openness to the German 
legislature and all German courts is recalling the post-war response to the fail-
                                                 
15  Note 5 above. 
16  See his contribution above. 
17  ‘Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into Länder, 
their participation on principle in the legislative process, or the principles laid down in 
Articles 1 and 20 shall be inadmissible’. 
18  GCC, paras 214, 209 ff., 238. 
19  GCC, para 211: ‘The citizens’ right to determine, in equality and freedom, public au-
thority with regard to persons and subject-matters through elections and other votes is 
the fundamental element of the principle of democracy. The right to free and equal 
participation in public authority is anchored in human dignity (Article 1.1 of the Basic 
Law)’. 
20  GCC, para 229. 
21  GCC, paras 279, 282. 
22  GCC, para 222: ‘The Preamble of the Basic Law emphasises, after the experience of 
devastating wars in particular between the European peoples, not only the moral basis 
of responsible self-determination but also the willingness to serve world peace as an 
equal partner in a united Europe’. Para 225: ‘The Basic Law wants European integra-
tion and an international peaceful order. Therefore not only the principle of openness 
towards international law, but also the principle of openness towards European law 
(Europarechtsfreundlichkeit) applies’. 
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ure of the German nation state and the ‘bitter experiences’ once mentioned in 
the Draft Constitutional Treaty.23 It is at the same time a significant comple-
ment of, if not departure from, the earlier Maastricht decision. 
The – potential – importance and significance of this dual structure in the 
Court’s reasoning stems from the tensions between these two commitments. 
These tensions should not to be trivialised as a constitutional confirmation of 
the indeterminacy thesis in critical legal studies. If taken seriously, they can be 
read as the kernel of a conflicts-law approach to European law. Tensions be-
tween conflicting legally-binding objectives are, of course, well-known in all 
constitutional democracies. In the case of the Union, however, these conflicts 
are inextricably linked with the competences of the different levels of govern-
ance. For precisely this reason, to acknowledge explicitly that the defence of 
democracy and the integration project are distinct and potentially conflicting 
objectives is a potentially liberating move. This is because we can then recon-
ceptualise the relation between European Union law and the legal systems of 
its Member States. Integration can rely on a dignity of its own. It need not aim 
at reconstituting democracy, as we have institutionalised it in the democratic 
constitutional state at European level. What we have to consider, instead, are 
the principles and rules that mitigate between the two commitments – this is 
what I mean by a new type of European conflicts law. 
If one examines the Court’s reasoning through such lenses, one discovers 
pertinent general pronouncement as well as a number of conflict-of-laws rules 
and mechanisms. 
The constitutional state commits itself to other states which are standing on 
the same foundation of values of freedom and equal rights and which, like it-
self, make human dignity and the principles of equal entitlement to personal 
freedom the focal point of their legal order. Democratic constitutional states 
can gain a formative influence on an increasingly mobile society, which is in-
creasingly linked across borders, only by sensible co-operation which takes ac-
count of their own interest as well as of their common interest. Only those who 
commit themselves because they realise the necessity of a peaceful balancing 
of interests and the possibilities provided by joint concepts gain the measure of 
possibilities of action that is required for being able to responsibly shape the 
conditions of a free society also in the future. With its openness to European 
integration and to commitments under international law, the Basic Law takes 
account of this.24 
                                                 
23  OJ C 310/2004, 1 of 16 December 2004. 
24  GCC, para 221. 
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Other pronouncements are more determined. Germany’s constitutional 
identity, so we read again and again,25 as defined in Article 23.1 sentence 3 in 
conjunction with the eternity clause of Article 79.3 of the Basic Law is a non-
negotiable constitutional ordre public.26 The doctrine of enumerated powers 
and the obligation of the Union to respect national identities are inter-
dependent.27 On the other hand, the Court adds that ‘[w]hoever relies on inte-
gration must expect the independent opinion-formation of the institutions of 
the Union’.28 
So far, so good. Other pronouncements are less plausible. It is difficult to 
understand the particular sensitivity of ‘decisions on substantive and formal 
criminal law (1), on the disposition of the police monopoly on the use of force 
towards the interior and of the military monopoly on the use of force towards 
the exterior (2), the fundamental fiscal decisions on public revenue and public 
expenditure, with the latter being particularly motivated, inter alia, by social-
policy considerations (3), decisions on the shaping of circumstances of life in a 
social state (4) and decisions which are of particular importance culturally, for 
instance as regards family law, the school and education system and dealing 
with religious communities (5)’.29 The simple explanation, that these matters 
have ‘always been deemed’ concerns does not tell us why they must not be Eu-
ropeanised. 
Such reserves seem inconclusive for two reasons. One concerns the coher-
ence of the Court’s reasoning. Why do the five fields just named deserve par-
ticular attention, while Germany’s Sozialstaatsgebot, despite its status as a 
constitutional essential, is taken so lightly? To this query we will turn in the 
next section. The second reason is the hesitance or failure of the Court to base 
its arguments upon a constructive vision of the integration project – a deficit to 
which we will return in the observations. 
2. The ECJ’s Labour-Law Jurisprudence in Conflicts-Law 
Perspectives 
In the numerous comments on the German judgment by the European law 
community, there is hardly any critical discussion of the performance of the 
ECJ. This controversy, one may of course argue, is not at issue in a debate on 
                                                 
25  GCC, paras 218 ff., 226, 239 ff., 332, 339, 343, 364. 
26  GCC, para 221. 
27  GCC, paras 234, 240. 
28  GCC, para 237. 
29  GCC, para 252. 
The Lisbon Judgment, Germany’s Sozialstaat, the ECJ’s Labour Law Jurisprudence … 
 33
the German Court. What seems nevertheless difficult to understand and to ac-
cept, is that Germany’s European law community fails to consider the impact 
of Europe’s growing socio-economic diversity, of the socially asymmetrical 
repercussions of the integration process30 and the changing inter- and infrana-
tional societal conflict configurations.31 This not-so-benign neglect of the so-
cial and political contexts of European law mirrors the legacy of our sub-
disciplinary separations and specialisations. Its implications in European-law 
discourses are an unfortunate neglect in the public-law division of the Euro-
pean law community of the spheres of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft on the one 
hand, and a ‘hands off’ mentality with regard to the constitutional debates in 
the private-law departments, on the other. – The labour law cases which I am 
going to review briefly here, however, clearly deserve attention outside the 
realm of labour law. I will come back to their exemplary importance in the 
concluding section. 
My concern is, for now, limited to an explanation of their conflict-of-laws 
dimensions. 
1. Viking, 11 December 2007:32 Finnish seafarers, employed on the ferry 
Rosella, become aware of the intention of their employer to register the ship in 
Estonia. Since they were afraid of losing their jobs or being forced to accept 
lower wages, they took action against their employer by threatening to strike. 
That was perfectly legal under Finnish law. But, so the Viking line argued, 
such action was incompatible with Viking’s right to free establishment as 
guaranteed by Article 43 EC. 
The response of the ECJ may sound conciliatory, but is, in fact, rigid. The 
ECJ starts out by solemnly underlining that the ‘right to take collective action, 
including the right to strike … [is] a fundamental right which forms an integral 
part of the general principles of Community law’.33 Then, however, the Court 
fundamentally re-configures the traditional balance between economic free-
doms at European level and social rights at national level, by holding that the 
Member States, although 
still free, in principle, to lay down the conditions governing the existence and 
                                                 
30  See, very widely debated, Neil Fligstein, Euro-clash: The EU, European Identity and 
the Future of Europe, Oxford, 2008. 
31  See, e.g., Lisbeth L. Hooghe/Gary Marks, ‘A Postfunctionalist Theory of European 
Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus’, British Journal 
of Political Science 39 (2008), 1-23. 
32  ECJ, C-438/05, International Transport Workers’ Federation, Finnish Seamen’s Union 
v Viking Line ABP, OÜ Viking Line Eesti, Judgment of 11 December 2007, 2007 
[ECR] I-10779. 
33  ECJ, Case C-438/05 (Viking), para 44. 
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exercise of the rights in question … must nevertheless comply with Commu-
nity law…. Consequently, the fact that Article 137 EC does not apply to the 
right to strike or to the right to impose lock-outs is not such as to exclude col-
lective action such as that at issue in the main proceedings from the applica-
tion of Article 43 EC. 
2. Laval, 18 December 2007:34 Laval, a company incorporated under Latvian 
law, had won the tender for a school-building on the outskirts of Stockholm. In 
obtaining the tender, it had profited from the much lower wages from Latvia to 
Sweden. In May 2004, when work was to commence, and after Laval had 
posted several dozens of its workers, the Swedish trade unions resorted to hos-
tile action against Laval with such determination and intensity that Laval 
ceded. 
The Unions had acted legally according to Swedish law. This, the Court 
found to be inconclusive, and it resorted, instead, to the posted workers Direc-
tive.35 This Directive does not, as underlined in its Recital 22, prescribe a 
comprehensive harmonisation. It requires a number of essential working condi-
tions to be met, so that foreign workers are not placed at a disadvantage. The 
wage level, however, is not included here. According to Article 3,36 wages 
should, in principle, be determined by law or by generally-binding collective 
agreements. Sweden, however, had not implemented the principle, but relied 
on the exception provided for in Article 8. It left the determination of wage 
levels to collective agreements and assumed that their generally-binding qual-
ity could also be determined by these agreements. 
There, so the Court determined, Sweden was wrong. It found it to be in-
compatible with the Directive 
                                                 
34  ECJ, Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, 
Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avd. 1, Svenska Elektrikerförbundet, Judgment 
of 18 December 2007 [ECR] I-11767. 
35  Directive 96/71/EC OJ 1996, L 18/1. 
35  Article 3 of that directive provides: ‘Terms and conditions of employment: 1. Member 
States shall ensure that, whatever the law applicable to the employment relationship, 
the undertakings referred to in Article 1(1) guarantee workers posted to their territory 
the terms and conditions of employment covering the following matters which, in the 
Member State where the work is carried out, are laid down … concerning the posting 
of workers in the framework of the provision of services.’ OJ 1996, L 18/1. 
36  Article 3 of that directive provides: ‘Terms and conditions of employment: 1. Member 
States shall ensure that, whatever the law applicable to the employment relationship, 
the undertakings referred to in Article 1(1) guarantee workers posted to their territory 
the terms and conditions of employment covering the following matters which, in the 
Member State where the work is carried out, are laid down … concerning the posting 
of workers in the framework of the provision of services.’ OJ 1996, L 18/1. 
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to impose on undertakings established in other Member States, … negotiation 
at the place of work, on a case-by-case basis, … so that the undertakings con-
cerned may ascertain the wages which they are to pay their posted workers.37 
3. Rüffert, 3 April 2008:38 Rüffert concerned the legality of a tender proffered 
by one of the German Länder, Lower Saxony, which contained a clause indi-
cating that the public authorities were bound to respect existing collective-
bargaining agreements, so that tendering firms would also be required to abide 
by the relevant collective-bargaining agreements. The ECJ held Lower 
Saxony’s legislation to be irreconcilable with Article 49, since it prevented 
foreign service-providers from benefiting from lower wage costs within their 
country of origin. 
The vital point within the judgment is its evaluation of the protective pur-
pose of the clause committing the public authorities to respect collective 
agreements: in this respect, the Court held that ‘contrary to the contentions of 
Land Niedersachsen and a number of the Governments, such a measure cannot 
be considered to be justified by the objective of ensuring the protection of 
workers.’39. 
This finding is all the more remarkable in view of a prior pertinent decision 
of Germany’s Constitutional Court which had explained only in 2006 that: 
The combating of unemployment, together with measures that secure the fi-
nancial stability of the social security system, are particularly important goals, 
for the realisation of which the legislator must be given a relatively large de-
gree of decisional discretion, and especially so under current, politically very 
difficult, labour market conditions.40 
What is at stake? The problématique becomes apparent when we rephrase the 
doctrines on supremacy and pre-emption, and the debates on maximum versus 
minimum harmonisation in terms of a conflict of laws. The basic operation to 
be undertaken in cases with international dimensions is called characterisation. 
                                                 
37  Ibidem, para 71; the preceding paragraph reads: ‘As regards the requirements as to 
pay which can be imposed on foreign service providers, it should be recalled that the 
first subparagraph of Article 3(1) of Directive 96/71 relates only to minimum rates of 
pay. Therefore, that provision cannot be relied on to justify an obligation on such ser-
vice providers to comply with rates of pay such as those which the trade unions seek 
in this case to impose in the framework of the Swedish system, which do not consti-
tute minimum wages and are not, moreover, laid down in accordance with the means 
set out in that regard in Article 3(1) and (8) of the directive.’  
38  ECJ, Case C-346/06, Rüffert v Land Niedersachsen, Judgment of 3 April 2008. 
39  Ibidem, para 38. 
40  GCC, 1 BvL 4/00 of 11.7.2006, <http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/ls20060711 
_1bvl000400.html>. 
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We have to consider the field in which we are operating. The conflict that we 
are confronted with, in the perspective of European law, is an application of 
the economic freedoms, but, in the perspective of the national jurisdictions, in-
volves collective labour law. Which qualification is correct? Which law gov-
erns? When posing such questions, we should recall that there is a fundamental 
difference between these two fields: one represents the law of the market, the 
other, the emancipation from the market’s operations.41 
But we have to take one further step. Conflict of laws and private interna-
tional law are concerned with the choice between national systems of rules. 
Choice-of-law methodologies and private-international-law justice are geared 
towards the selection of the proper jurisdiction; they represent ‘nationalising’ 
endeavours. In the EU, however, we are operating in a multi-level system of 
governance. 
At this point, I may recall my assertions about the implicit conflict-of-laws 
dimensions of the Lisbon judgment, which are re-stating the communis opinio 
of European law ever since van Gend en Loos. The powers of the European 
level of governance are enumerated. There is no European, state-equivalent 
kompetenz-kompetenz. We cannot assume supremacy, but we do have to ad-
dress and resolve a conflict. This challenge concerns both levels. As the judg-
ment has explained, under German constitutional law, we have to take two 
conflicting commitments into account. Does Germany’s commitment to inte-
gration require the subordination of its Arbeitsverfassung to the European free-
doms? And vice versa, does the European primary law require such subordina-
tion. What guidance does Article 137(5) of the Treaty (unchanged by Article 
153 of the Treaty of Lisbon) offer? Europe is not empowered to legislate on 
‘pay, the right of association, the right to strike or the right to impose lock-
outs’. This is not a definite answer, to be sure. Its reach and its importance both 
require more general reflections. 
                                                 
41  ‘Dans les sociétés d’Europe de l’Ouest, le droit du travail s’est constitué par émancipa-
tion du droit du marché, dénommé moyennant les variations terminologiques qu’il im-
porte de ne pas oublier : liberté du commerce ici, freedom of trade ailleurs… Ce n’est 
pas que des règles sur le travail n’existaient pas avant cette émancipation, mais elles re-
levaient d’avantage d’une police du travail, partie plus ou moins autonome d’une police 
du ou des marchés’, thus Antoine Lyon-Caen, ‘Droit communautaire du marché vs Eu-
rope sociale’, Contribution to the Symposium on ‘The Impact of the Case Law of the 
ECJ upon the Labour Law of the Member States’, organised by the Federal Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs, Berlin 26 June 2008 (on file with author). 
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3. Conflicts Law as a Response to the European Legitimacy 
Problematic 
The conflict constellation of the labour law cases is by no means exceptional. 
Discrepancies between the operation of the European level of governance and 
national jurisdictions can be observed, albeit in less drastic forms, wherever 
the solution of a problem requires us to resort to competences which are allo-
cated partly at European, and partly at national, levels of government.42 Con-
structive responses can be, and have been found, often enough in innovative 
decisions.43 
However, these ‘diagonal’ conflict constellations and their particular 
problématique are symptomatic of a deeper structural problem to which the 
Lisbon Court refers in its reference to Fritz Scharpf’s decoupling thesis,44 and 
its discussion of 
the case-law of the Court of Justice has to be taken into account, which, ad-
mittedly, has until most recently given rise to criticism of a “one-sided market 
orientation” of the European Union.45  
The status of this statement is a bit opaque, but it does lead to the core issues. 
In its third headnote, the Court explains that the Member States of the Union 
should ‘retain sufficient room for the political formation of the economic, cul-
tural and social circumstances of life’. This commitment to the legacy of 
Herrmann Heller is re-iterated later at various stages of the Court’s reason-
ing.46 Three, in part, normative and, in part, factual queries follow from this 
explicit recognition of the social state as an indispensable element of Ger-
                                                 
42  Christian Joerges, ‘The Impact of European Integration on Private Law: Reductionist 
Perceptions’, European Law Journal 4 (1974), 378-406; Christoph Schmid, ‘Diagonal 
Competence Conflicts between European Competition Law and National Regulation: 
A Conflict of Laws Construction of the Dispute of Book Price-Fixing’, European Re-
view of Private Law 8 (2000), 155 ff. 
43  See the examples discussed in Christian Joerges, ‘The Challenges of Europeanization 
in the Realm of Private Law: A Plea for a New Legal Discipline’ (Herbert Bernstein 
Memorial Lecture 2003), Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 24 
(2005), 149-196; also at: <http://www.iue.it/PUB/law04-12.pdf>. 
44  Fritz W. Scharpf, ‘The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diver-
sity’, Journal of Common Market Studies 40 (2002), 645-670, recently renewed by 
idem, The Double Asymmetry of European Integration – Or: Why the EU Cannot Be 
a Social Market Economy, Cologne: MPIfG Working Paper 09 /12. 
45  GCC, paras 394, 398. 
46  GCC, paras 217, 253, 257 ff. 
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many’s constitutional identity. One concerns the tensions between Germany’s 
two constitutional commitments. In this respect, the Court’s pronouncement 
seems clear. The social state is a constitutional ordre public, which must not be 
subordinated to integrationist objectives. The second, more factual, query con-
cerns the social state of the Union. Are we really witnessing an erosion of the 
social state? No, we learn, the tensions perceived by analysts such as Scharpf 
are ‘false conflicts’: 
Neither is the European Union without any social-policy competences, nor is 
it inactive in this area. At the same time, the Member States have a sufficient 
space of competences to take essential social-policy decisions on their own re-
sponsibility.47 
False conflicts and false warnings, the Court continues, because: 
(…) there are also no indications justifying the assumption that the Member 
States are deprived of the right, and the practical possibilities of action, to take 
conceptual decisions regarding systems of social security and other social pol-
icy and labour market policy decisions in their democratic primary areas.48 
This is an all-too-simplistic response. Not only does the Court fail to substanti-
ate how this fortunate equilibrium came about and which mechanisms ensure its 
sustainability, it also remains, at best, opaque with respect to a third query which 
this insistence on Germany’s constitutional identity provokes. Does this imply 
that it is the nation state which is to defend Hermann Heller’s constitutional leg-
acy? In the pertinent passages, the Court insists that Sozialstaalichkeit ‘must re-
main a primary task of the Member States, even if co-ordination which goes as 
far as gradual approximation is not ruled out’.49 This conclusion may do justice 
to the present state of ‘social Europe’. It is, nevertheless, unfortunate, because it 
seems to insinuate that the tensions between the contrasting commitments to 
democracy and European integration require a defence of the nation state, with-
out, however, explaining how this objective can be accomplished. 
This is by no means the message of the conflicts-law approach. This approach 
does not content itself with merely acknowledging the normative commitment of 
the Basic Law to the integration project and the ‘bitter experiences’ that have mo-
tivated its acceptance. The approach also rests on structural arguments with nor-
mative implications. As Jürgen Neyer and I expressed it back in 1997: 
The legitimacy of governance within constitutional states is flawed in so far as 
it remains inevitably one-sided and parochial or selfish. The taming of the na-
                                                 
47  GCC, para 393. 
48  GCC, para 399. 
49  GCC, para 259. 
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tion-state through democratic constitutions has its limits. [If and, indeed, be-
cause] democracies pre-suppose and represent collective identities, they have 
very few mechanisms to ensure that “foreign” identities and their interests are 
taken into account within their decision-making processes. 
In such perspectives, the integration project is functionally and normatively 
firmly embedded. Its functional reasonableness rests on its potential to resolve 
problems with which the nation state cannot autonomously cope. Its normative 
core is a new understanding of European legitimacy. ‘If and, indeed, because’ 
European commitments compensate structural democracy deficits of the nation 
states and respond to the interdependency of the Member States and the Union, 
European integration obtains a dignity of its own.50 
The hesitancy or refusal of the Lisbon Court to envisage a democratic 
Europe is deplorable because the Court has failed to develop a constructive vi-
sion for the European project. At the same time, the opportunity was missed to 
confront the ECJ with the fallacies of its recent jurisprudence. This jurispru-
dence is a fairly dramatic step towards a dismantling of fundamental institu-
tional dimensions of the Sozialstaat – and its incompatibility with the social 
legacy of the integration project. This legacy rests, of course, on sociologically 
weak grounds. However, the non-establishment of a European Sozialstaatlich-
keit in the Treaty of Rome was not meant as a deliberate exposure of the 
Member States to the erosion of their welfare systems, but was based upon the 
assumptions of liberal economics and the political promise that the opening of 
European borders would remain compatible with the social embeddedness of 
their economies.51 One may question the legal commitments arising from such 
assumptions and promises. But, then, the argument that Europe’s constitution 
                                                 
50  See the following passage from Dieter Grimm: ‘Durch die Vergemeinschaftung ehe-
dem exklusiver Zuständigkeiten gewinnen die Mitgliedstaaten der Union gleichzeitig 
Einfußnahmen auf der europäischen Ebene und vermittelt über sie auf die anderen 
Mitgliedstaaten. Bei der Wahrnehmung dieser Einflußmöglichkeiten liegt der Staat an 
der Leine der nationale Verfassung, die auf diese weise ihren Wirkungsbereich über 
die Staatsgrenzen hinaus ausdehnt, dort allerdings demselben Anspruch anderer Ver-
fassungen begegnet.’ (‘Zur Bedeutung nationaler Verfassungen in einem vereinten 
Europa’, in Detlef Merten/Hans Papier (eds), Handbuch der Grundrechte, Vol. VI 2, 
Heidelberg 2009, § 168, para 58. 
51  This argument has been elaborated in much detail by Florian Rödl in his ‘Labour 
Constitution’, in Principles of European Constitutional Law, Armin v. Bogdan-
dy/Jürgen Bast (eds), 2nd ed., Oxford, forthcoming 2010, and, more recently, his 
‘Transnationale Lohnkonkurrenz: ein neuer Eckpfeiler der “sozialen” Union?’ in And-
reas Fischer-Lescano/Florian Rödl/Christoph Schmid (eds), Europäische Gesell-
schaftsverfassung. Zur Konstitutionalisierung sozialer Demokratie in Europa, Baden-
Baden 2009, 145-160. 
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is partial, and hence a socially and democratically unfinished project, remains 
valid. 
The starting point of the Lisbon Court, we have to conclude sadly, fails to 
live up to the promises that we have tried to read into the contest of democracy 
and integration. It should be acknowledged that the Court did not plead for a 
protection of the state as such, but as an organisational instrument and guaran-
tee of democratic self-rule.52 Democratic self-rule, however, is then decoupled 
from Hermann Heller’s legacy without further ado. Equally disappointing, the 
democracy failure of the nation state goes unnoticed and the potential of the 
European project to compensate for these failures remain unexplored.  
 
                                                 
52  GCC, paras. 217 ff. 
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Being Wrong but Getting It Right? The Lisbon Judgement of the 
GCC* 
Susanne K. Schmidt 
1. Introduction 
In the following, I would like to argue for a more positive assessment of the 
Lisbon judgement. Obviously, reading the many criticisms of the judgement, 
one easily agrees: Yes, the Court pursues an idea of parliamentary legitimation 
one might not share; it assumes for itself a role of umpire that is hard to accept 
– nationally towards the Parliament and the government as well as towards 
other Member states and the European institutions; it follows a line of reason-
ing which is being highly harmful to the EU, particularly if other constitutional 
courts followed suit. 
Therefore, one would have hoped that the GCC had argued differently. And 
yet: being tied between needing to accept politically the Treaty and having sig-
nificant grounds for scepticism, maybe this was as good as it could get? After 
all, the main concerns of the GCC about an incremental expansion of compe-
tences overstretching the original mandate next to the problems of democratic 
legitimation beyond the nation state are well-grounded. Moreover, the con-
cerns about sovereignty that the GCC utters are argued on the basis of democ-
ratic self-determination – which is not such a weak point after all. What could 
be reasons to see the ruling in a more benevolent light, even if one is critical 
about its precise wording and argumentation? 
As a political scientist, I do not see myself well-placed in the following to 
analyze the ruling as such. Rather I would like to contribute to the question of 
its impact on the general dynamic of European integration. My argument takes 
two steps. I first describe the problem of integration through case law by the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ), the detrimental effects of which can hardly 
be controlled politically. This implies, secondly, that we need forms of intra-
legal remedies if we want to confront a hyperactive ECJ. Seeing the GCC rul-
ing in this context, I draw the conclusion that even when sharing the criticism 
of the Court’s argumentation, within the overall logic of European integration 
                                                 
*  I would like to thank the participants of the workshop at BIGSSS for their comments. 
My notes draw on research being undertaken in the context of the Collaborative Re-
search Centre 597 ‘Transformations of the State’, funded by the German Research 
Foundation. 
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the Court might have given an important signal. 
2. The Expansionary Logic of ECJ Jurisprudence 
What is the force of de-facto integration through law? The importance of case 
law for the progress of European integration is well-established in political sci-
ence.1 It was Weiler who forcefully showed that the weakness of political ac-
tors in European integration at the same time allowed the Court to foster inte-
gration during the times of ‘Eurosclerosis’.2 The very difference that the estab-
lishment of direct effect and supremacy of European law could make for Euro-
pean integration became apparent to the wider circle of observers with the Sin-
gle European Act and the completion of the internal market. Building on the 
Cassis judgement of 1979,3 market integration was no longer dependent on 
agreement in the Council of Ministers, but could rely on economic actors, us-
ing the fundamental freedoms of the Treaty to escape from the regulatory grip 
of Member States. Following the example of the freedom of goods, also the 
other freedoms have been increasingly interpreted as a prohibition of restric-
tion, rather than as simply requiring non-discrimination.4 The implications are 
immense: not only different types of market regulations, but also rules of ac-
cess to universities or to social benefits may be challenged by individual ac-
tors, claiming their rights under the basic freedoms.5 Member states upholding 
national regulations may therefore be required to justify these rules, and to 
show that the resulting restriction of freedoms is proportionate. The ECJ has 
interpreted this need rather strictly, implying that few national regulatory inter-
ests stand up to the test. 
On the basis of this expansionary jurisprudence, European integration has 
long reached those areas where the GCC in its ruling sees the need to keep na-
tional sovereignty untouched: social services, health care as well as taxes.6 
                                                 
1  Lisa Conant, ‘Review Article: The Politics of Legal Integration’, Journal of Common 
Market Studies 45 (2007), 45-66. 
2  Joseph H. H. Weiler, ‘The Community System: The Dual Character of Supranational-
ism’, Yearbook of European Law 1 (1981), 267-306. 
3  Karen J. Alter/Sophie Meunier-Aitsahalia, ‘Judicial Politics in the European Commu-
nity. European Integration and the Pathbreaking Cassis de Dijon Decision’, Compara-
tive Political Studies 26 (1994), 535-561. 
4  Peter Oliver/Wulf-Henning Roth, ‘The Internal Market and the four Freedoms’, 
Common Market Law Review 41 (2004), 407-441. 
5  Fritz W. Scharpf, ‘Legitimacy in the Multilevel European Polity’, European Political 
Science Review 1 (2009), 173-204. 
6  Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen, ‘The Europeanization of Welfare – The Domestic Impact 
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Surprisingly, the GCC ignores this development.7 
From an intergovernmentalist political-science perspective, one would ar-
gue that all this could not happen if the Member States were not agreeing to 
this extent of integration.8 However, the balance of powers at the supranational 
level is such that an independent judiciary gains in influence because of the 
weakness of the legislature. Different from the national level, ECJ rulings can 
hardly be counterbalanced politically by the legislature. The much more de-
manding decision rules at the supranational level protect case law. The weak-
ness of the legislature implies a bias in favour of Court-led integration, as al-
ready Weiler observed.9 Yet, it is not necessary to assume that the Court pur-
posefully advances integration beyond the interest of the Member States. The 
independence of courts is well-legitimated in the EU, but nevertheless their in-
stitutional position may become threatened if they continuously raise public 
contention with their rulings. Generally, therefore, we can assume that the ECJ 
like any other court is interested in keeping antagonism at bay.10 Yet, at the 
European level this is much more difficult to achieve than it is at the national 
level. For one thing, the consequences of individual rulings have to be trans-
lated into the institutional contexts of the very different Member States. With 
by now 27 Member States representing increased institutional variation, this is 
hardly possible. Moreover, different from the national level, where in conten-
tious cases courts get an idea of the public opinion on the underlying issues, 
public opinion is lacking at the supranational level. If a public opinion forms at 
all, like with the Laval and Viking cases, it is already too late. Given this com-
plex institutional environment, the ECJ would be much more dependent on a 
legislative check than a national court is. Yet, even when compared to constitu-
tional interpretations at the national level, supra- or international case law can 
hardly be remedied. 
                                                                                                                                                      
of Intra-European Social Security’, Journal of Common Market Studies 43 (2005), 
1027-1054. Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen, ‘The Social Policy Clash – EU Cross-Border 
Welfare, Union Citizenship and National Residence Clauses’, Paper presented at the 
10th Biennial Conference of the European Union Studies Association (EUSA). Mont-
real, Canada 2007. Philipp Genschel, ‘Why no mutual recognition of VAT? Regula-
tion, taxation and the integration of the EU’s internal market for goods’, Journal of 
European Public Policy 14 (2007), 743-761. 
7  See para 117 of the ruling under: <http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheid 
ungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html>. 
8  Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Integration: A Rejoinder’, 
Journal of Common Market Studies 33 (1995), 611-628. 
9  Joseph H. H. Weiler, note 2 above. 
10  Georg Vanberg, ‘Legislative-Judicial Relations: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Con-
stitutional Review’, American Journal of Political Science 45 (2001), 346-361. 
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Next to a skewed balance of powers, and a Court which can hardly assess 
the implications of its rulings anymore, we are faced with an underlying nor-
mative basis, the Treaty, favouring certain rights over others. On the basis of 
the economic freedoms, private actors may overturn national market regula-
tion, despite the higher legitimacy of the latter, by simply referring to Euro-
pean law, whether cross-border issues or trade distortions are directly involved 
or not. It generally suffices that a restriction of European economic rights is 
likely. Those actors profiting from the national regulation, in contrast, do not 
have any means to counter this process of negative integration. Some actors 
are therefore able to refer to European law, while others cannot. Once case law 
exists, it leads to a path-dependent process.11 Precedent motivates actors to 
turn to European law, if they believe that existing case law favours their inter-
ests. This one-sided demand of actors brings a positive feedback towards in-
creased liberalization.  
The unfolding of this path-dependent process is not hampered by the fact 
that for all actors it is difficult to foretell how the court will strike the balance 
between the interests of individual economic rights and public interest con-
cerns of Member States. Thus, recently, the Court did not take a very liberal 
line in the last Doc Morris ruling (C-531/06). Where most observers would 
have expected the freedom of services to take precedence over national regula-
tory concerns, this was not the case. The Court as such can strike the balance 
in either direction in a single case. But over all cases, as only certain actors 
claim certain rights from the ECJ, and the Treaty grants predominantly eco-
nomic rights, the ECJ case law favours these actors and rights over national 
regulatory interests. The Court’s primary orientation is to further integration. 
And by granting individuals European rights, the Court at the same time fos-
ters the legitimation of the supranational entity which bestows these rights 
upon these individuals. 
We therefore have several structural features for why we see the extension 
of European competences over national competences, for why it is so difficult 
to strike a federal balance between national and European competences: Euro-
pean rights are of a certain kind; precedent establishes a positive feedback as 
actors will address the Court mainly with cases of one specific kind; strength-
ening individual European rights is a means for the Court to legitimate the 
European legal order; at the same time, it is hardly possible for the ECJ to as-
                                                 
11  Martin Shapiro/Alec Stone Sweet, On Law, Politics, and Judicialization, Oxford/New 
York 2002, 113. I develop this argument further in Susanne K. Schmidt, ‘Die Pfadab-
hängigkeit supranationaler Rechtsprechung. Die Dienstleistungsrichtlinie als Resultat 
von “lock-in”’, Manuscript Bremen, 2009. 
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sess the national implications of its case law; and the Member states, or the 
European legislative in general, cannot rein in the Court even if case law is 
very contentious. 
Recently, Vauchez and Alter12 have shown how European lawyers man-
aged to extend the reach of European law most skillfully, by bringing up cases 
strategically to foster certain legal interpretations, in order to establish the ECJ 
as a motor for integration. It is surprising that for long there has not been more 
inner-legal opposition to this move. After all, it is quite easy to see that Euro-
pean lawyers would be a relevant lobby for the importance of European law. 
But it is not so easy to understand why national constitutional lawyers, for in-
stance, would not object, or private lawyers13, as with the growing relevance 
of European law the importance of other sub-disciplines is weakened. 
I can only sketch here my argument that there are hardly any remedies 
against a hyperactive court if it is not embedded within a national polity. At the 
supranational level, it follows from this analysis that opposition can only come 
from within the legal system. 
3. The GCC’s Ruling: Getting It Right? 
On the basis of this integration dynamics, notwithstanding the general criti-
cism, the ruling achieves two points: It raises awareness about the incremental 
overstretching of European competences into areas which the Masters of the 
Treaty aimed at keeping for national democratic decision-making. And it 
threatens with inner-judicial opposition. It is important to note that this opposi-
tion is not in any way exclusively directed to the ECJ but similarly targets the 
expansionary interpretation of competences by the other European institutions. 
In its ruling, the GCC gives itself the right to judge over ultra vires and suffi-
cient remaining national identity. It is critical that it usurps itself this right, 
rather than announcing to address preliminary proceedings to the ECJ when in 
doubt about European law. Using the preliminary ruling procedure would be 
much more cooperative – and not as threatening to the integrated European le-
gal order. In fact, so far, the GCC has never referred a case to the ECJ, asking 
                                                 
12  Antoine Vauchez, ‘ “Integration-through-Law” Contribution to a Socio-history of EU 
Political Commonsense’, EUI Working Papers RSCAS 2008/10, Florence 2008; 
Karen J. Alter, ‘Jurist Advocacy Movements in Europe: The Role of Euro-Law Asso-
ciations in European Integration (1953-1975)’, in Alter, Karen J. (ed), European 
Court’s Political Power. Selected Essays. New York 2009, 61-89. 
13  See Heinrich Honsell, ‘Die Erosion des Privatrechts durch das Europarecht’, Zeit-
schrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 29 (2008), 621-630. 
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for an interpretation of relevant European law. Just announcing preliminary 
procedures would be a much more subtle resistance to overreaching case law, 
but possibly also too subtle. There would be little incentive for the ECJ to re-
dress the European federal balance. A group of German lawyers was quick to 
demand from the German legislature to shape this new procedure by requiring 
the GCC to refer always to the ECJ, thereby reining it in legislatively in its 
quest for redressing the European federal balance.14 This, of course, also 
shows the problématique of the ECJ where such responses are hardly possible. 
Of course, it is not clear what will become of these GCC procedures to con-
trol the transfer of competences to the European level. On the basis of this ex-
ample, other European constitutional courts might become similarly disapprov-
ing of the ECJ. Were all constitutional courts to threaten with opposition, the 
integration project would be at serious risk. But the amount of criticism the 
GCC had to face after its judgment does not make it so obvious that it will play 
constantly the role of umpire over European integration. Given the contention, 
neither is it likely that too many other constitutional courts will follow suit. 
Having once faced the threat of national judicial opposition, there is at least the 
hope that the ECJ will aim to strengthen the dialogue with the national courts 
in the future, enabling it to assess better the implications of its rulings at the 
national level, and thereby achieving a greater balance between European and 
national concerns. 
4. Conclusion 
In conclusion, it is to be hoped that the ECJ will finally sense the danger of 
wanting too much at once. A Union of 27+ gives the ECJ tremendous powers – 
political opposition to case law becomes less likely than ever; and at the same 
time, the Court may feel that the problems of legislative politics require inte-
gration impulses from it. The heterogeneous Union of today has a range of 
problems – but whether a lack of integration depth counts among them is 
doubtful. In this situation, the hyperactive ECJ of the Laval and Viking kind 
may be the greatest menace as it cannot be grounded in sufficient political 
support. In view of the threat posed by the GCC, it seems most likely that the 
ECJ will be more careful to balance European requirements against national 
concerns. If it does, this will be of great service to the integration project. 
                                                 
14  ‘Auswege aus dem drohenden Justizkonflikt’. <www.whi-berlin.de/documents/whi-
material0109.pdf>. 
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Reinforcing the Asymmetries of European Integration  
Michael Blauberger 
Critical accounts of EU politics diagnose various asymmetries1 resulting from 
the dynamics of integration: (1) European integration is dominated by judicial 
and executive politics rather than legislative politics. (2) The constitutionaliza-
tion of European Treaty freedoms provides an opportunity structure for indi-
viduals claiming their rights, but the capacity to pursue public interest concerns 
at the national level is undermined and it is not fully compensated for at the 
European level. (3) Finally and closely connected to both previous aspects, EU 
integration and EU democratization have not developed synchronously and, 
therefore, the EU suffers from a ‘democratic deficit’.  
These criticisms have been pointed out in the complaints against the Treaty 
of Lisbon and were discussed during the proceedings before the German Consti-
tutional Court (GCC). The final judgement addresses all of these issues, but it 
fails to provide any remedy. In contrast, through its interpretation of the integra-
tion process so far and by erecting barriers to further integration, the GCC sus-
tains and even reinforces the asymmetrical status quo of European integration. 
1. The Supremacy of the Judiciary  
According to intergovernmentalist theory, European integration mainly helps 
national governments to emancipate themselves from political constraints at 
the domestic level.2 European Treaty rules are negotiated on intergovernmental 
conferences and European legislation needs approval by the Council of Minis-
ters. On the contrary, neo-functionalist theory emphasises the independence of 
the ECJ in interpreting the European Treaties and the agenda-setting powers of 
the Commission due to its exclusive right to propose European legislation.3 
Despite opposed readings of European politics, both approaches agree upon 
one point: National Parliaments are the losers of integration. Political compe-
tences are increasingly transferred to the European level, national parliamen-
                                                 
1  Cf. Fritz W. Scharpf, ‘The Double Asymmetry of European Integration. Or: Why the 
EU Cannot Be a Social Market Economy’, Köln: MPIfG Working Paper 09/12 (2009). 
2  Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal 
Intergovernmentalist Approach’, Journal of Common Market Studies 31(4) (1993), 
473-524, 507. 
3  Mark A. Pollack, ‘Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Commu-
nity’, International Organization 51(1) (1997), 99-134, 105. 
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tarians lack time and expertise to control effectively their governments in 
European affairs, and once new European rules have been negotiated, the 
choice of national parliamentarians is often one between uncritical ratification 
and outright rejection.  
Initially, the Lisbon judgement received widespread applause for strength-
ening the position of the German Parliament in European affairs.4 This ap-
plause seems premature at best. Firstly, the judgement hardly affects parlia-
mentary involvement in day-to-day European politics, but it is only concerned 
with fast-track changes to European Treaty law. The Lisbon Treaty includes 
several provisions designed to facilitate Treaty modifications without new rati-
fication procedures in the Member states, e.g. the transition from unanimity to 
majority voting in the Council. The GCC found the German law accompanying 
the Treaty5 to be unconstitutional because parliamentary inaction would have 
been sufficient to approve these Treaty modifications.6 Following the condi-
tions of the Lisbon judgement, the revised law requires domestic legislation in 
these cases. Secondly, this enhanced participation of the German parliament as 
regards Treaty modifications would have been possible without any Court rul-
ing, if the German parliament had simply decided to include these participation 
rights in the original law. Apparently, national parliamentarians did not see the 
necessity to do so when they passed the original law with a two-thirds major-
ity. Hence, the GCC truly ‘condemns’ the German parliament to more partici-
pation in EU Treaty modifications. But why should we expect parliamentarians 
to follow this judgement in practice? At the end of the day, Members of the 
German Bundestag (MdBs) still get (re)elected by citizens showing modest in-
terest in European affairs rather than by constitutional judges. Finally, where 
the Treaty of Lisbon actually tries to enhance participation of national parlia-
ments in day-to-day EU politics this is hardly mentioned in the judgement. 
During the proceedings in Karlsruhe, one MdB (Thomas Silberhorn, CSU) ex-
plicitly argued for the Lisbon Treaty, because it would strengthen parliament 
vis-à-vis the German government – the legal representative of the German par-
liament (Prof. Franz C. Mayer) rushing to declare that this MdB was only 
speaking on his own behalf.  
                                                 
4  See, for example, Heribert Prantl, ‘Europäische Sternstunde’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 1 
July 2009, 4 (‘Das Urteil nimmt den Bundestag in die Pflicht. Dieser wird die EU-
Gesetze nicht mehr einfach durchwinken können. (…) Die Abgeordneten werden sich 
viel mehr als bisher mit Europa befassen müssen. Europa wird also zu einem innenpo-
litischen Thema. (…) Das Urteil verurteilt den Bundestag zu mehr Demokratie.’).  
5  Act Extending and Strengthening the Rights of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat in 
European Union Matters (Bundestag document 16/8489).  
6  GCC, paras 306-328. 
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Rather than strengthening the national parliament, the GCC in its Lisbon 
judgement largely claims the right to decide itself about the appropriate institu-
tional roles and about the distribution of competences between the national and 
European levels. The German parliament has to legislate in all cases of Treaty 
modifications, despite its original intention not to do so.7 It must not approve 
any transfer of competences to the European level which touches upon the 
German ‘constitutional identity’ guaranteed by Art. 79(3) GG – the scope of 
this guarantee being interpreted (extensively) by the GCC.8 The European par-
liament cannot claim truly to represent European citizens, only being an organ 
representing the European peoples9 – regardless of the explicit wording of the 
Treaty of Lisbon (Art. 14) and despite the examples of other parliaments such 
as the US Senate with highly disproportional patterns of representation. The 
ultimate right to define the boundaries between European and German consti-
tutional law is said to remain in the hands of the GCC,10 and the supremacy of 
European law is interpreted narrowly and in latent contradiction to Declaration 
17 annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon.11 The GCC proposes the creation of a new 
procedure in order to scrutinise European breaches of competences and in-
fringements upon the German constitutional identity – however, if no such 
procedure gets established, the GCC announces to treat these issues anyway 
within the existing legal framework.12 By and large, therefore, the Lisbon 
judgement is only superficially about redressing the imbalance between 
branches and about strengthening parliaments – it is much more concerned 
with the question which judiciary has the ultimate say and it provides a clear 
answer in favour of the GCC’s own position.13  
2. The Individual-Rights Bias of the Judiciary 
European integration does not only exhibit a high degree of judicial politics, 
but these judicial politics have an asymmetrical impact themselves. Most 
prominently, Fritz Scharpf14 has argued that the institutional structure of the 
                                                 
7  GCC, paras 413-417. 
8  GCC, paras 218, 249. 
9  GCC, para 217.  
10  GCC, para 240. 
11  GCC, paras 72-77, 331.  
12  Para 241. 
13  See also Christoph Möllers, ‘Was ein Parlament ist, entscheiden die Richter’, Frank-
furter Allgemeine Zeitung, 16 July 2009, 27. 
14  Fritz W. Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? Oxford/New York 
1999, 43 ff. 
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EU is biased towards negative integration. On the one hand, the ECJ forcefully 
developed the doctrines of supremacy and direct effect and, thereby, elevated 
the market freedoms to constitutional principles. On the other hand, due to 
high consensus requirements and their increasingly heterogeneous interests, 
Member States were largely unsuccessful in constraining the ECJ and they 
could only partly compensate their loss of national regulatory authority 
through harmonisation at the European level. While Scharpf’s position was 
sometimes labelled the ‘social-democratic’ critique of European integration15, 
conservatives have argued in a similar direction more recently.16 Despite all 
differences – Herzog and Gerken criticise the ECJ for rather being ‘too social’ 
e.g. in its rulings on antidiscrimination – these critical voices share one com-
mon concern: through its interpretation of market freedoms, the ECJ creates 
individual rights for European citizens that tend to undermine the ability of 
Member States to pursue public-interest concerns at the domestic level.17  
Scharpf proposes that Member States should politically counterbalance ECJ 
jurisprudence by the threat of open non-compliance against judicial lawmak-
ing, backed up by a qualified majority vote in the Council.18 Apart from this 
political approach, others expected the GCC to provide a judicial safeguard for 
Germany’s autonomy to pursue public policies. During the proceedings in 
Karlsruhe, the German left party (Die Linke, represented by Prof. Andreas 
Fisahn) basically argued that the ECJ’s jurisprudence on the European Treaties 
infringed upon the German constitutional principle of the ‘social state’ by es-
tablishing an irreversible commitment to an ‘open market economy’.19 The 
conservative side (MdB Peter Gauweiler, CSU, represented by Prof. Dietrich 
Murswiek) argued even more generally that the Treaty of Lisbon crosses the 
‘threshold to the insignificance of the original German legislative compe-
tences’.20 Unsurprisingly, the GCC did not find these complaints convincing in 
its final judgement – otherwise, it would have had to declare the German 
agreement to the Lisbon Treaty unconstitutional and trigger a fundamental cri-
sis of the EU. Nevertheless, the Lisbon judgement at its core tries to define 
                                                 
15  Andrew Moravcsik, ‘In Defence of the “Democratic Deficit”: Reassessing Legitimacy in 
the European Union’, Journal of Common Market Studies 40(4) (2002), 603-624, 617. 
16  Roman Herzog/Lüder Gerken, ‘Stoppt den Europäischen Gerichtshof’, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, 8 September 2008, 8. 
17  Fritz W. Scharpf, ‘Individualrechte gegen nationale Solidarität’ in Martin Höp-
ner/Armin Schäfer (eds), Die Politische Ökonomie der europäischen Integration, 
Frankfurt am Main 2008, 89-99. 
18  Fritz W. Scharpf, ‘Legitimacy in the Multilevel European Polity’, European Political 
Science Review 1(2) (2009), 173-204, 199 f. 
19  GCC, para 117.  
20  GCC, para 103. 
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limits of European interference at the domestic level and clearly threatens with 
German disobedience in cases in which these limits are not respected.21 Even 
though the GCC has not found any instance of European law ultra vires so far, 
one might argue, the threat is out there and – as any ‘nuclear option’22 – it is 
most successful, if it does not have to be used.  
Yet, this threat is very unlikely to change anything about the asymmetry de-
scribed above between individual rights and public interests concerns. In con-
trast, the GCC is pre-dominantly concerned with individual rights itself, which 
becomes clear from its interpretation of the remaining core of state sover-
eignty. Accordingly, Member states need to  
retain sufficient space for the political formation of the economic, cultural and 
social circumstances of life. This applies in particular to areas which shape the 
citizens’ circumstances of life, in particular the private space of their own re-
sponsibility and of political and social security, which is protected by the fun-
damental rights, and to political decisions that particularly depend on previous 
understanding as regards culture, history and language and which unfold in 
discourses in the space of a political public (…).23  
Already during the proceedings, the constitutional judges devoted much more 
time to questions of criminal law than any of the complainants. In its list of 
particularly sensitive areas of state sovereignty, criminal law is followed by the 
monopoly of force.24 If the attention devoted during the proceedings as well as 
order and text length in the judgement reflect the GCC’s own priorities, then 
we should expect clashes with European judges to be most likely in those areas 
in which European public policies can infringe upon individual freedoms, i.e. 
as regards the prosecution of particular crimes or the legality of telecommuni-
cations-data retention. Conversely, the paragraphs on the principle of the ‘so-
cial state’25 are kept very brief and conclude simply that there are ‘no indica-
tions justifying the assumption that the Member States are deprived of the 
right, and the practical possibilities of action, to take conceptual decisions re-
garding systems of social security and other social policy and labour market 
policy decisions’. In striking contrast to the critical tenor of the judgement, the 
GCC affirmatively cites ECJ rulings on EU social citizenship to justify its po-
sition.26 Thus, combined with the claim that ‘essential decisions in social pol-
                                                 
21  GCC, paras 240 f., 340.  
22  Ibidem. 
23  GCC, para 249. 
24  GCC, paras 253ff., 351 ff.  
25  GCC, paras 392-399. 
26  GCC, paras 395, 398.  
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icy (…) must remain a primary task of the Member States’27, this endorsement 
of ECJ jurisprudence reaffirms existing asymmetries and even seems to pre-
clude political integration which touches upon ‘essential decisions’ in this pol-
icy field. 
3. The Adherence to a State-Centred Model of Democracy 
Finally, if the process of European integration disadvantages national parliaments 
and if it reduces the autonomy of Member States to pursue public policies, this 
raises the question of democratic legitimacy of EU politics. Only few political 
scientists still maintain that the EU does not suffer from any ‘democratic defi-
cit’.28 Most others rather differ on whether and how this deficit could be re-
duced.29 Yet, the GCC strongly reaffirms the status quo again – denying already 
existing deficits while precluding future steps to democratise EU politics.  
During the proceedings in Karlsruhe, one major point of debate addressed 
the further democratisation of EU politics required by additional steps of inte-
gration (‘schritthaltende Demokratisierung’). In his introductory remarks, 
Judge Di Fabio emphasised that governance in supranational organisations and 
networks was not per se incompatible with democratic principles and that it 
should not be measured against a traditional state model of democracy. Also, 
the judgement reaffirms that: ‘In principle, the principle of democracy is open 
to the requirements of a supranational organisation’.30 Despite this rhetoric, 
however, the judgement largely dismisses the possibility of more than mar-
ginal democratic legitimacy beyond the nation state or of any intermediate 
stages towards a state-like EU democracy. The term ‘schritthaltende Demokra-
tisierung’, stemming from the GCC’s 1993 Maastricht judgement, does not re-
appear in the Lisbon judgement. Instead, the EU is merely ‘free to look for its 
own ways of democratic supplementation’.31 Most importantly, the European 
parliament is not considered to provide substantial democratic legitimacy be-
cause of its disproportional representation of European citizens.32  
In any event, for the Court, the European Parliament remains a marginal insti-
tution (…). With its ruling, the Court has expressed its wish to prevent the 
                                                 
27  GCC, para 259. 
28  Moravcsik, note 15 above. 
29  Armin Schäfer, ‘Nach dem permissiven Konsens. Das Demokratiedefizit der Europäi-
schen Union’, Leviathan 34(3) (2006), 350-376, 351. 
30  GCC, para 267. 
31  GCC, para 272. 
32  GCC, para 280. 
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European Union from developing its own democratic legitimacy as a second 
pillar of a European compound system, where governmental decisions are 
made at two levels in two different institutional contexts. In our age of global-
ization, it seems fairly odd to contend that genuine democracy can exist only 
within the framework of the nation-state.33  
Moreover, by adhering to a state-centred model of democracy and negating its 
applicability to the EU, the GCC also manages to deny already existing de-
mocratic deficits: ‘The European Union complies with democratic principles 
because a qualitative look at the structure of its responsibility and of its rule 
reveals that it is exactly not laid out in analogy to a state’.34 The judgement 
remains vague as to how – according to this negative definition of suprana-
tional democracy – the EU could ever be found to be democratically deficient 
as long as it does not aspire to become an entity ‘in analogy to a state’. Hence, 
the asymmetries described above and their critical implications for democratic 
legitimacy at the national level are defined away; the increasing difficulties of 
27 EU Member States to change a political path once taken or to correct judi-
cial lawmaking at the EU level are not addressed as problems of democratic 
legitimacy. As a result of circular reasoning, any effort to redress the imbal-
ance between EU integration and democratisation appears to be unnecessary 
and/or impossible: Only as a state could the EU be (truly) democratic. Not be-
ing a state, the EU does not need to be (truly) democratic.  
In sum, the German Lisbon judgement reinforces already existing asymme-
tries of European integration. The ECJ’s important role in pursuing ‘integration 
through law’ is mirrored by the GCC reasserting its ultimate right to control the 
limits of integration. Both judiciaries are primarily concerned with individual 
rights which are seen to be potentially threatened by domestic or European pub-
lic policies. Already existing democratic deficits are tolerated in the judgement 
while new obstacles for a democratisation of EU politics are erected.  
Presumably, this critical reading of the Lisbon judgement can be criticised 
itself for being based on undue expectations of how the GCC could solve po-
litical problems. Judicial self-restraint rather than the GCC’s ‘most fundamen-
tal of all fundamental judgements’35 could have prevented such expectations 
and, at the same time, it would have left more routes open for redressing im-
balances of European integration. The latter task – it is even more obvious af-
ter the Lisbon judgement than before – is an essentially political one. 
                                                 
33  Christian Tomuschat, ‘The Ruling of the German Constitutional Court on the Treaty 
of Lisbon’, German Law Journal 10(8) (2009), 1259-1261, 1261. 
34  GCC, para 278, emphasis added.  
35  Prantl, note 4 above.  
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Accountability Without Politics? 
The Contribution of Parliaments to Democratic Control of EU 
Politics in the German Constitutional Court’s Lisbon Ruling 
Arndt Wonka 
1. Introduction 
In its ruling, the German Federal Constitutional Court (GCC) declares the Lis-
bon Treaty and the consequent changes of the German Basic Law (GG) as con-
stitutional. However, the legislation dealing with the implementation of the Lis-
bon-Treaty rules on the involvement of national parliaments in the European 
Union (EU) (Ausweitungsgesetz) is declared unconstitutional. The GCC de-
mands changes that strengthen the institutional involvement of the Bundestag 
and, in case Länder competences are touched, also that of the Bundesrat in the 
areas of criminal law and EU military interventions and, perhaps most impor-
tantly, in any changes of the primary EU treaty law based on Article 48 EUV as 
well as the decisions based on the general clause of Article 352 AEUV (GCC, 2 
BvE 2/08, 406–420). The GCC bases its ruling on Article 38 of the German Ba-
sic Law (GG), in combination with Articles 20, 79 and 23 GG, which demand 
that German citizens can hold their government accountable and exert signifi-
cant influence on the direction of (German) public policy through parliamentary 
elections. The public reactions to the GCC’s ruling varied strongly. Some wel-
comed the strengthening of the Bundestag and Bundesrat emphatically as an 
important contribution towards an increase of the democratic legitimacy of the 
EU in Germany1. Others, however, have strongly criticized the GCC for think-
ing of the democratic legitimization of the EU exclusively in national categories, 
for restricting the capacity of the German government to act at the EU level 
thereby supposedly putting breaks on the EU’s overall capacity to act, and, fi-
nally, for claiming for itself the right to decide on the limits of German legisla-
tors’ future transfers of competencies and sovereignty to the EU2.  
This contribution discusses the role the GCC assigns to the Bundestag and 
Bundesrat on the one hand and the European Parliament (EP) on the other in 
the democratic control of EU politics by taking the GCC’s own standard of 
German citizens’ ability to hold decision-makers accountable and to exert in-
fluence on the (EU) policy agenda (Art. 38 GG) as a benchmark. It is argued 
                                                 
1  Heribert Prantl, ‘Europäische Sternstunde’, Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 30 June 2009. 
2  Joschka Fischer, ‘Ein nationaler Riegel’, Die Zeit, 9 January 2009. 
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below that the GCC’s refusal to acknowledge the EP’s potential to contribute 
independently to the political accountability of EU decision-makers vis-à-vis 
German citizens is not convincing because, in its interpretation of the EU and 
the EP, the GCC relies on a nation-state analogy which does not follow from 
the institutional reality created by the Lisbon Treaty. By drawing on this na-
tion-state analogy, the GCC holds the EP up to standards it cannot meet. At the 
same time, by exclusively relying on institutional remedies and ignoring the 
behavioural and political dimension, the GCC overestimates the current poten-
tial of the Bundestag to hold the German government accountable. The ‘poli-
tics’ dimension of accountability3, however, is of core importance. Only if de-
cision-makers report vis-à-vis the public and the parliament, thereby allowing 
citizens to form an idea about what the EU is and does and an opinion and 
preferences about what EU decision-makers should do with the power dele-
gated to them, can citizens use their electoral powers in a meaningful way to 
punish the government for EU actions that are not in line with their respective 
preferences. As a consequence, the remedies to increase the accountability and 
democratic legitimacy of the EU proposed by the GCC in the Lisbon ruling are 
hardly effective. 
2. Parliaments (and Political Parties) in the GCC Lisbon 
Ruling 
The GCC’s premise that German citizens need to be able to hold their repre-
sentatives accountable for their decisions and exert influence on the broad 
goals of future policies which strongly affect their lives4 will hardly provoke 
any opposition from students of democracy5. Yet, what has been universally 
accepted for democratic nation states is a matter of contestation for the EU. 
While it has been argued that the EU can claim legitimacy for its decisions due 
to the quality of its outputs6 or the extensive domestic checks which member-
state executives as the main domestic actors in EU politics face7, the number 
                                                 
3  Mark Bovens, ‘Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework’, 
European Law Journal 13 (2007), 447-468. 
4  GCC, 2 BvE 2/08, paras 210-215, 246-247, 268-272. 
5  Thomas Christiano, The rule of the many: fundamental issues in democratic theory, 
Boulder 1996. 
6  Fritz Scharpf, Regieren in Europa. Effektiv und demokratisch?, Frankfurt 1999; Gian-
domenico Majone, ‘The Credibility Crisis of Community Regulation’, Journal of 
Common Market Studies 38 (2000), 273-302. 
7  Andrew Moravcsik, ‘In Defence of the “Democratic Deficit”: Reassessing Legitimacy 
in the European Union’, Journal of Business 40 (2002), 603-624. 
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of those arguing for more direct democratic control of EU politics by EU citi-
zens has constantly risen during the last years8. The perception of a need for 
citizens to hold national and European EU decision-makers more directly ac-
countable also seems to be shared by member state governments, which con-
sider the EP an adequate institutional forum for this purpose: In successive 
treaty revisions starting with the Single European Act in 1986 they extended 
the EP’s powers in a number of areas, most importantly perhaps by making it a 
co-equal legislator in legislative decisions taken through the co-decision pro-
cedure9. The Lisbon Treaty continues the institutional strengthening of the EP 
and at the same time extends the parliamentarization of the EU to the national 
level by giving national parliaments a more prominent, if mostly consultative, 
role in EU politics (e.g. Article 12 EUV, Protocols 1 & 2). 
In its Lisbon ruling the GCC accords member state governments the prime 
role in governing the EU and national parliaments the central role in holding 
executive actors taking EU decisions accountable. The EP is assigned a sup-
plementary role.10 The GCC’s reasoning thereby departs from governments’ 
strategy of increasing EU decision-makers direct democratic accountability – 
and consequently the legitimacy of EU politics and policies – through extend-
ing the powers of the EP. The latter is, according to the GCC, a consequence of 
the lack of a European people with a shared identity, which expresses its po-
litical will through fair and equal elections, in which equality refers to the 
equal (counting) value of each citizen’s vote.11 Equality certainly is a core cri-
terion for designing electoral institutions in democratic nation states. A com-
mon identity, however, is no precondition to hold EU decision-makers ac-
countable. More important is the ability of citizens to learn about EU political 
elites’ decision-making behaviour and the political rationale behind it. This 
again allows citizens to cast their vote in national as well as European Parlia-
ment elections in a meaningful way, i.e. holding office holders accountable for 
past behaviour and exerting influence on the future policy agenda12. 
                                                 
8  Andreas Follesdal/Simon Hix, ‘Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Re-
sponse to Majone and Moravcsik’, Journal of Common Market Studies 44 (2006), 
533-562; Fritz W. Scharpf, ‘Legitimacy in the multilevel European polity’, European 
Political Science Review 1 (2009), 173-204. 
9  Berthold Rittberger, Building Europe’s parliament: democratic representation beyond 
the nation-state, Oxford 2005; Frank Schimmelfennig/Berthold Rittberger/Alexander 
Bürgin/Guido Schwellnus, ‘Conditions for EU constitutionalization: a qualitative 
comparative analysis’, Journal of European Public Policy 13 (2006), 1168-1189. 
10  GCC, para 262. 
11  GCC, paras. 279-280, 285-286. 
12  Christiano, note 5 above. 
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In principle, the European Parliament provides an institutional venue which 
could fulfil exactly this function of creating public awareness of EU decisions. 
Moreover, national parliaments and the EP are no competitors in this regard. 
Both can help to create public awareness and increase the accountability of EU 
decision-makers and the EP can even be considered to be in a privileged posi-
tion as its members are the only representatives of an EU institution who are 
directly elected by member-state citizens and thus also directly accountable for 
their behaviour in EU politics. The EU – at least currently – is not a full-blown 
state but rather a strongly institutionalized form of inter-state cooperation with 
considerable powers delegated to supranational institutions. In such an institu-
tional setting voting equality is not a necessary condition for an institution such 
as the EP to be able to create public awareness of EU politics, thereby allowing 
citizens in different member states to learn about EU policies that might affect 
their personal well-being and provide them with means to hold decision-
makers at the EU level directly accountable. By discussing the EP’s institu-
tional quality and EU democracy enhancing potential in analogy to nation-state 
parliaments, the GCC gives away these potentials. 
Yet, when discussing the EP’s potential to increase the democratic account-
ability of EU decision-makers it should be noted that EU politics lacks a mean-
ingful discourse among political leaders on the future direction of EU policies. 
This is true for EU politics in general13 but also holds for interactions in the 
EP. Although voting in this institution is structured ideologically, regularly pit-
ting European Parliamentarians from the left against those of the right14, the 
EP hardly manages to ignite public political debate. Moreover, EP election 
campaigns are run on national topics and citizens’ votes therefore cannot pro-
vide direction for EU policies15. Thus, while successive treaty revisions made 
the EP an institutional powerhouse, it is failing as regards the creation of a 
meaningful debate on EU politics which could inform citizens in member 
states. From such a perspective, the problem is not that the EP lacks a people 
with a uniform, i.e. European, identity allowing it to contribute to the legiti-
macy of EU as stated by the GCC and discussed as necessary for the losers of 
                                                 
13  Stefano Bartolini, Restructuring Europe. Centre formation, system building and politi-
cal structuring between the nation-state and the European Union, Oxford 2005; Peter 
Mair, ‘Political Opposition and the European Union’, Government and Opposition 42 
(2007), 1-17. 
14  Simon Hix/Abdul Noury/Gérard Roland, Democratic Politics in the European Parlia-
ment, Cambridge 2007. 
15  Oskar Niedermayer, ‘Europa als Randthema: Der Wahlkampf und die Wahlkampfstra-
tegien der Parteien’, in Oskar Niedermayer/Hermann Schmitt (eds), Europawahl 2004, 
Wiesbaden 2005, 40-46; Hermann Schmitt, ‘The European Parliament elections of Ju-
ne 2004: Still second-order?’, West European Politics 28 (2005), 650-679. 
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majority decisions to accept decisions by the majority16. Yet, currently citizens 
do accept majority decisions and are at the same time unable to exert their EP 
voting rights in a meaningful way. The EP rather suffers from a lack of politics 
resonating with the domestic publics in member states allowing citizens to 
form preferences on EU policies that make EP voting meaningful and effective 
in providing political accountability of EU decision-makers. To be sure: in or-
der to be able to make members of the EP’s political efforts resonate in the 
German public it not only needs increased efforts by MEPs to make them-
selves heard, but also relies on the willingness of German media and political 
elites communicating and engaging with these. 
Are there any signs that the Bundestag will be able to fulfil the strong expec-
tations the GCC and a number of commentators put on it in providing checks on 
the actions of the German government in EU politics? Article 23 of the German 
Basic Law provides the Bundestag and Bundesrat with information and consul-
tation rights vis-à-vis the government in EU political affairs. In addition, Art. 45 
GG established a European affairs committee, dealing with Treaty issues, while 
other policy issues are dealt with by the specialized committee competent in the 
respective policy area17. The scarce systematic empirical research on how and to 
which effect these consultation and information rights vis-à-vis governments are 
exercised by members of the Bundestag indicates that MPs are mostly infor-
mally active within their parliamentary parties18 to influence the government’s 
EU positions and decisions. Yet, the overall power of the Bundestag to hold 
German ministers sitting in the Council accountable is considered to be rela-
tively weak19. In addition, while EU-related politicking in the German 
Bundestag, in case it takes place at all, is primarily of an informal and non-
transparent nature, it is largely absent from electoral competition. While German 
political parties systematically integrate the EU in their general ideological pro-
file20 and the prominence of the EU as a topic in national election campaigns 
has increased since the 1970s, EU issues still made up only about 3 percent of 
German political parties’ issue-specific statements in their national (Bundestag) 
election campaigns during the 1990s21. As a consequence, German voters are 
                                                 
16  Scharpf, note 6 above, 17-19. 
17  Katrin Auel/Arthur Benz, ‘The Politics of Adaptation: The Europeanisation of Na-
tional Parliamentary Systems’, Journal of Legislative Studies 11 (2005), 372-393, 385. 
18  Ibidem, 389. 
19  Thomas Saalfeld, ‘Deliberate delegation or abdication? Government backbenchers, 
ministers and European legislation’, The Journal of Legislative Studies 11/3 (2005), 
343-371, 360. 
20  Gary Marks/Carole Wilson, ‘The Past in the Present: A Cleavage Theory of Party Re-
sponse to European Integration’, British Journal of Political Science 30 (2000), 433-459. 
21  Hanspeter Kriesi, ‘The Role of European Integration in National Election Campaigns’, 
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hardly informed about EU politics – and governments that come out of these 
parliamentary elections can hardly be said to hold anything similar to an EU 
mandate. It is therefore hard to see how the Bundestag can live up to securing 
the popular democratic control of the German government in EU affairs which 
the GCC demanded in its Lisbon ruling. 
Accordingly, when taking its own standards of accountability and citizens’ 
influence on the general political direction (Art. 38 and 20 GG) as a bench-
mark, the GCC’s reasoning is not convincing. Given the insufficient public po-
litical treatment, i.e. politicization, of EU issues by German party political el-
ites, it is hard to see how German citizens can be considered to hold their par-
liamentary representatives, and thus indirectly also the German government, 
accountable for EU politics. The GCC circumvents this discussion by claiming 
that the EU leaves ample space for German legislators to shape policies in 
what the GCC defines as ‘core’ fields of (German) state activity – criminal 
law, war and peace, public expenditures and taxation, welfare, culture and re-
ligion22. While these claims allow the GCC to refrain from demanding a 
stronger and more direct democratic control of EU decision-makers and their 
decisions, they are hardly substantiated. Instead they seem to ignore that al-
ready today, EU decisions strongly affect the ability of member states to de-
cide on the organization of their welfare and industrial-relations regimes, 
which directly affect citizens’ welfare in EU member states and increasingly 
provoke open political contestation of EU decisions23. 
3. (Political) Shortcomings of the GCC Legal Reasoning and 
the Limits of a Judicial Cure for the EU’s Democratic  
Deficiencies 
Two main criticisms have been raised against the arguments laid out by the 
GCC in its Lisbon ruling as regards German national parliaments’ and the 
European Parliament’s potential to hold EU decision-makers accountable and 
increase the democratic legitimacy of EU politics: First, its principled refusal 
of the EP’s (not yet realized) potential to provide citizens with a means to hold 
EU decision-makers directly accountable, thereby directly contributing to the 
                                                                                                                                                      
European Union Politics 8 (2007), 83-108, 95. 
22  For a criticism on the GCC’s ambition to define the limits of Germany’s integration 
into the EU, see Christoph Möllers, ‘The German Constitutional Court says “Ja zu 
Deutschland”’, German Law Journal 10/8 (2009), 1241-1257, 1249 ff. 
23  Martin Höpner/Armin Schäfer, ‘A New Phase of European Integration. Organized 
Capitalism in Post-Ricardian Europe’, MPIfG Discussion Paper 4 (2007). 
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legitimacy of EU politics. Second, the GCC’s overestimation of the role the 
Bundestag can and will play in shaping EU policies and the effectiveness of 
(today’s) elections and public discourse in this process. Closely related to the 
last point, the GCC’s underestimation and non-substantive argumentation of 
the (high) degree to which member states are still sovereign in many substan-
tive policy areas was criticized. Given that EU decisions, both legislative and 
judicial, increasingly provoke political opposition, the accountability of EU 
decision-makers and the democratic political legitimation of EU decisions not 
only is of theoretical interest but might also be of political relevance with re-
spect to securing the EU’s capacity to act and the compliance of member state 
governments. 
Given the strong economic, political and societal differences between the 
member states of the EU of 27 and the resulting differential welfare effects on 
citizens in different member states, an EU-wide debate that engages citizens in 
all member states simultaneously in a discussion on substantive EU policy is-
sues seems highly unlikely24 – even after, as has been suggested, some institu-
tional engineering such as the direct election of the Commission President25. 
To be taken up by the national media and to allow citizens to relate EU issues 
to their own political stakes and welfare, a meaningful and viable political con-
test on EU politics must rather take place at the member-state level. Yet, as the 
discussion above showed, German party political elites so far are reluctant to 
make the EU a topic of their political contestation. This might be a deliberate 
strategy by Germany’s integration-friendly parties – CDU, FDP, Greens and 
SPD – in order to avoid allowing parties which take a critical stance on Euro-
pean integration, such as Die Linke, to reap electoral benefits from contesting 
on the EU. As a consequence, EU politics still largely operates at the (non-
public) elite level and, although the gap might have been narrowed26, member-
states citizens see the EU more critically than (party) political elites27 
How then might political contestation on EU issues be ignited given that 
German party political elites seem reluctant to engage in it? German interest 
                                                 
24  Adam P. Brinegar/Seth K. Jolly/Herbert Kitschelt, ‘Varieties of capitalism and politi-
cal divides over European integration’, in Gary Marks/Marco R. Steenbergen (eds), 
European Integration and Political Conflict, Cambridge 2004, 62-89. 
25  Follesdal and Hix, note 8 above. 
26  Marco R. Steenbergen/Erica Edwards/Catherine E. De Vries, ‘Who’s Cueing Whom? 
Mass–Elite Linkages and the Future of European Integration’, European Union Poli-
tics 8 (2007), 13-35. 
27  Cees Van der Eijk/Mark N. Franklin, ‘Potential for contestation on European matters 
at national elections in Europe’, in Gary Marks/Marco R. Steenbergen (eds), European 
Integration and Political Conflict, Cambridge 2004, 32-50. 
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groups will continue to mobilize domestically on an issue-specific basis trying 
to influence EU policies relevant for their constituencies, thus creating public 
awareness to which political parties might then be forced to react – as was the 
case in the Services (‘Bolkestein’) Directive recently. Moreover, radical parties 
might discover the EU as an issue for which there is a considerable electoral 
potential, thus forcing mainstream parties to take a stand on EU issues28 – 
something we have witnessed in other EU countries29. Finally, the media itself 
might get more attentive to the EU and ask political elites for their perspective 
on and position in EU politics. For the time being, German citizens must live 
with the fact that they are hardly able to hold their representatives accountable 
for their EU actions and decisions. So far this ‘permissive consensus’ allowed 
political elites to proceed with European integration without explicit public 
consent. Yet, there are good arguments that this period is over, given the extent 
to which the EU interferes with member states’ policies30. It might be the po-
litically most dissatisfying aspect of the GCC’s Lisbon ruling that its demand 
for a change of the German Ausweitungsgesetz, which was adopted by the 
Bundestag and Bundesrat without significant public recognition, created the 
illusion of German EU politics that are democratically accountable. This, how-
ever, hardly fits political reality. 
 
                                                 
28  Ibidem. 
29  Hanspeter Kriesi/Edgar Grande/Romain Lachat/Martin Dolezal/Simon Bornschier/ 
Timotheos Frey, West European Politics in the Age of Globalization, Cambridge 
2008. 
30  Liesbet Hooghe/Gary Marks, ‘A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: 
From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus’, British Journal of Political 
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Judicial Sovereignty Unlimited? A Critique of the German  
Federal Constitutional Court's Ruling on the Lisbon Treaty 
Andreas Fischer-Lescano 
The European idea is discredited. A broad societal alliance perceives Europe as 
a bastion of neoliberalism, militarism, bureaucracy. And indeed, in Europe’s 
name armed forces combat in the operation Atalanta piracy off the Horn of Af-
rica and turn themselves into an army of intervention; in Europe’s name the 
External Border Agency FRONTEX erects a fortress causing thousands to 
drown in the Mediterranean; in Europe’s name the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) established the primacy in application of supranational law, whose very 
formation contradicts democratic ideas and whose substance more than once 
violates our sense of justice: the effet utile of European law is also an effet neo-
liberal.1 One is well-advised not to accept this development and to scandalise 
when the United State Apparatuses of Europe perceive democratic participa-
tion rights, in the form of referenda, as operational hazards, when they turn 
European solidarity into a mere redistributive bottom-to-top mechanism, and 
when they initiate competition for ever-lower wages among Member States. 
Paradoxically, national coalitions not only in Germany now argue that 
Europe becomes more social, pacifist and democratic not by reshaping the 
European process but by opposing it. This state-monopolist resistance move-
ment ranges in German politics from Peter Gauweiler’s CSU to Diether Dehm’s 
LINKE, from the Max Planck Institute of a Fritz Scharpf to the ordoliberal think 
tank of the Freiburg School à la Roman Herzog and Lüder Gerken (CEP). For 
them, the remedy against the increasing independence of European state appara-
tuses is to replace European political contexts with reestablished national poli-
tics. After the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court in June 2009, this 
unitas oppositorum proclaimed itself stage winner: it argued that in its Lisbon 
verdict the German Constitutional Court (GCC) had put its national foot down, 
dressed in its ‘Yes, but’ concerning the Lisbon Treaty. 
However, those celebrating the Lisbon ruling as a political victory of a state 
that counters European interventions with a stern ‘L’Etat c’est moi’ and that 
isolates the German welfare state from asocial European developments base – 
                                                 
1  See Christoph U. Schmid, ‘Vom effet utile zum effet neolibéral. Eine Kritik des neues 
judiziellen Expansionismus des Europäischen Gerichtshofs’, in Andreas Fischer-
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in the century of the transnational constellation – their democratic hopes on the 
‘primary spaces’ (as the GCC calls them2) of national communities of fate. 
They misread the ruling in a twofold way: First and in contrast to the interpre-
tation of the nationalist critique of Europe, the GCC did not foreclose the per-
spective of a European federal state but requires for the latter the German peo-
ple to express directly their intention, hence it requires a referendum on 
Europe.3 Second, the Karlsruhe ruling cannot be smooth talked into a success 
of emancipatory politics for a social and radically democratic Europe. To the 
contrary, a European legal politics geared towards the emancipatory ideal has 
to recognise that the Court is not interested in the development of a social 
Europe and that it has not made more likely the realisation of social and de-
mocratic principles in Europe. 
An emancipatory legal politics for Europe has to take account of both di-
mensions of the ruling, in order to avoid following the little complex equa-
tions: ECJ = guardian of neoliberalism, BVerfG = guardian of the welfare state. 
There is need to come to a European policy that involves itself into the struggle 
for European law from the inside of the European legal form and not from a 
national outside. A simple ‘back to the nation state’ fails to recognise that 
European law is in many aspects more liberal than many national laws, for in-
stance, when it comes to issues of migration in general and the right for family 
reunification of third country nationals in particular. The ECJ has, for example, 
strengthened family rights in a number of decisions vis-à-vis national authori-
ties willing to expel.4 Also in the area of anti-discrimination and trans-
European social benefits for Union citizens, the Court is quite progressive.5 
1. The Restriction of Social Rights 
European law is not simply neoliberal devil’s work, but like all law part of a 
dialectical process; it is both a stronghold of the hegemonic bloc and a bastion 
of the subalterns. An emancipatory legal politics in Europe needs to engage 
into these ‘struggles for law’ and to increase the responsiveness of European 
law for the social question in the postnational constellation. In essence, the 
Karlsruhe ruling contributes nothing of value to this debate. The Court has cer-
tainly shown the formal will to power, at the same time it made also clear in 
the justifying passages on human dignity and social rights that it does not in-
                                                 
2  GCC, para 360. 
3  GCC, paras 217, 228. 
4  ECJ, Carpenter (11.7.2002), C-60/60.  
5  ECJ, Mangold (22.11.2005), C-144/04. 
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tend to defend social rights against a European race to the bottom. 
This becomes already apparent in the part of the ruling dealing with admis-
sibility. Some of the complainants had in their pleadings, referring to the deci-
sion of the ECJ in the Laval case, stressed the danger that in the European con-
text human dignity was not safeguarded from being balanced. Human dignity 
is the starting point for a whole range of fundamental rights to social subsis-
tence and to the self-constitution of individuals; hence, it is the participatory 
fundamental right par excellence and, therefore, the expression of the co-
originality of the rights to existence and participation. 
It is surprising with how little effort the Court justified the rejection of 
those claims as unsubstantiated. In the Laval ruling of the ECJ, the scandalous 
sentence can be found that ‘the exercise of the fundamental rights at issue, that 
is, freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and respect for human dig-
nity, respectively, (...) must be reconciled with the requirements relating to 
rights protected under the Treaty [for instance, the fundamental rights] and in 
accordance with the principle of proportionality’.6 The Lisbon Treaty even in-
creases the risk and the reality of the dependence on human rights in the Euro-
pean context, as Article 52 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
which comes into force with the Lisbon Treaty, establishes in difference to 
German law no differentiated system of fundamental rights guaranteed by sim-
ple or qualified provision or even unconditionally; rather, it makes the exercise 
of all fundamental rights mentioned in the Charter subject to legal approval ac-
cording to which restrictions can be imposed ‘if they are necessary and genu-
inely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to 
protect the rights and freedoms of others’. 
One would have hoped that the Constitutional Court had more to say about 
the scandal of weighing up human dignity as a human right than its reference 
that it remains reserved to future proceedings to determine whether and to what 
extent a reduced protection of fundamental rights at the European level can 
justifiably be criticised at all, and which requirements such complaints have to 
fulfil.7 This reference to an uncertain future shows that the Court pursued in its 
ruling not so much an emancipatory concern than rather an interest in its insti-
tutional self-preservation, and that it is therefore not ready to accept uncondi-
tionally the guiding effect of ECJ decisions. In a later passage the Constitu-
tional Court becomes even clearer in this matter, and announces that in future 
it intends to examine whether the Union respects the principle of subsidiarity, 
whether European legal acts remain within the confines of those sovereign 
                                                 
6  ECJ, C-341/05, 8.12.2007, Laval, para 94. 
7  GCC, para 189. 
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rights granted by conferral, and whether the untouchable kernel of the German 
Basic Law according to Article 23(1)(3) in conjunction with Article 79(3) re-
mains preserved.8 More than this formal will to power can however not be dis-
tilled from the ruling: one wonders, why national citizens should actually have 
an interest in a national constitutional court, if the latter thinks it not worth 
mentioning the infringement of the most inviolable goods of all, namely hu-
man dignity, made apparent in the reasoning for one of its decisions? 
The GCC provides the democratic idea in Europe only with stones instead 
of bread. It adopts a formal-institutional approach and unties the central nexus 
of social and democratic rights, although also in the Basic Law ‘the position of 
the welfare state idea in the legal principle of the democratic and social rule of 
law is geared towards the extension of the substantive constitutional idea of 
democracy to the economic and social order as well as the cultural life’.9 This 
is exactly the crux of a decision that seeks to tackle the devil of neoliberal 
globalisation with the Beelzebub of (nation-)state institutions and thereby fails 
adequately to address the social question: how can, between Karlsruhe and 
Berlin, the societal spaces of autonomy usurped by an unfettered global econ-
omy be re-established in an emancipatory vein? In this matter central for social 
democracy, the Constitutional Court retreats to the argument that it is not evi-
dent that ‘the Member States are deprived of the right, and the practical possi-
bilities of action, to take conceptual decisions regarding systems of social secu-
rity and other social policy and labour market policy decisions in their democ-
ratic primary areas’.10 This position ignores the interweaving of European wel-
fare systems, the conditions for the possibility of the constitutionalisation of 
social democracy in Europe and democratic forms of participation that tran-
scend the ideology of the identity of legal authors and addressees in national 
‘primary spaces’ (e.g., the rights to strike, freedom of communication, etc.). 
How little the Court was susceptible to democratic forms of participation in 
the ‘secondary spaces’ beyond the state is reflected in its apologetic claim that 
the social qualities of Europe become apparent as the ECJ ‘even established 
the existence of a European fundamental right to strike’.11 However, the Con-
                                                 
8  GCC, para 240. 
9  Wolfgang Abendroth, ‘Zum Begriff des demokratischen und sozialen Rechtsstaates 
im Grundgesetz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, in Alfred Herrmann (ed), Aus Ge-
schichte und Politik. Festschrift für Ludwig Bergstraesser, Düsseldorf 1954, 279 ff.; 
see also Andreas Fischer-Lescano/Oliver Eberl, ‘Der Kampf um ein soziales und de-
mokratisches Recht. Zum 100. Geburtstag von Wolfgang Abendroth’, in Blätter für 
deutsche und internationale Politik 51 (5/2006), 577-585. 
10  GCC, para 399. 
11  GCC, para 398. 
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stitutional Court remains silent about the fact that the ECJ made this right to 
strike immediately subject to the reservation of consideration of fundamental 
freedoms in the above-quoted Laval ruling and initiated in the field of social 
rights a downward spiral in European law. A court seriously interested in de-
mocratic and fundamental social issues would have started here and would 
have had to offer substantive guidance for a way out of the debris field of so-
cial democracy in Europe. 
The logic of this decision does not strengthen the welfare state as a precon-
dition for national democracy, to the contrary it rather offers a reading that 
takes trans-European structures of solidarity12 as an imposition and seeks to 
cement Europe as an ‘economic administration union’ by invoking national 
cultures and special paths (Sonderwege). It seeks to establish Europe as an in-
terest group of technocratic managerialism, which rejects the horizontal effect 
of fundamental rights (and hence the legal form of the socialisation of private 
actors); which rejects when the ECJ establishes a broad interpretation of the 
European anti-discrimination law in the Mangold case; which rejects the fact 
that migration and family rights are strengthened by European law. If this point 
of view prevails, the economic winners of Europeanisation are able to protect 
themselves against losses in European law – as the controversy surrounding 
the Mangold case indicates.13 
2. Parliamentary Sham-Legitimation 
The guiding principle of the ruling is the meticulous quest for national check-
points to strengthen national structures of legitimacy. In its ruling, the Federal 
Constitutional Court sees itself not only as the guardian of the constitution but 
also of the democratic participation rights in Europe and postulates that even 
after Lisbon ‘the Bundestag as the body of representation of the German peo-
ple [has to remain] the focal point of an interweaved democratic system’.14 
In the Bundestag, all political groups welcomed this point. The reading of the 
legislative package to implement the decision turned into a contest in parliamen-
tary participation strengthening – and that although the Bundestag had not only 
passed the accompanying law objected to by the Constitutional Court, but had 
also stressed throughout proceedings in the Constitutional Court that the com-
                                                 
12  See for a reconceptualization Hauke Brunkhorst, Solidarity. From Civic Friendship to 
a Global Legal Community, Cambridge 2005. 
13  Lüder Gerken/Volker Rieble/Günther H. Roth/Torsten Stein/Rudolf Streinz, ‘Man-
gold’ als ausbrechender Rechtsakt, München 2009. 
14  GCC, para 277. 
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plaints were unfounded. That the Court called on the Bundestag against its resis-
tance to accept its democratic duty begs the question whether the German legis-
lative body is in general structurally capable, willing and able to meet the Hercu-
lean task of democratising poly-centric European governance. 
Here scepticism is in place. The notion, apparent in the verdict, that in a dif-
ferentiated world society the solution of problems of neoliberal globalisation 
can essentially be transferred to a national parliament cooperating with a con-
stitutional court is a phantasmagoria, with which the Constitutional Court 
fights against processes of transnationalisation and in which it imagines a na-
tional ‘primary spaces’15 as a room for activity. 
It becomes obvious that this approach falls short, when one turns to a cen-
tral field that the Constitutional Court wants to shield from supranationalisa-
tion: the constitutive requirement of parliamentary approval concerning de-
fence. The latter is argued to be ‘integration-resistant’.16 It is a chimera to 
think that such a parliamentary patriotism could pacify European and global 
governance relations. The reservation of parliament has in the area of defence 
definitely a function of responsibility ascription; this is why one should work 
towards also involving the European Parliament in military decision-making in 
a constitutive way. But for the pacification of a nation at war, the parliamen-
tary reservation is rather part of the problem than the solution: a parliamentary 
oversight of NATO operations and of the development of the NATO Treaty is 
basically non-existent. Parlamentarisation has brought no observable, effective 
control of military operations. The German Bundestag has yet in a single case 
to deny consent to a governmental request for posting. The humanitarian inter-
vention in Kosovo, the military campaign against piracy off the Horn of Af-
rica, the Operation Enduring Freedom as alleged enduring self-defence – the 
German Bundestag has provided all these missions with a sham legitimation, 
despite serious indications that these missions are not in conformity with inter-
national law and the German constitution.  
A legal oversight of operations and decisions is lacking everywhere. The 
Federal Constitutional Court examines only formalistically, whether a parlia-
mentary decision exists.17 Thus far the Court has in no case adequately ad-
                                                 
15  GCC, para 360. 
16  GCC, para 235, the German word ‘integrationsfest’ is not directly translated into the 
English version of the judgment. 
17  Andreas Fischer-Lescano, ‘Bundeswehr als globaler Sicherheitsdienstleister? Grenzen 
der Zustimmungsfähigkeit von bewaffneten Streitkräfteeinsätzen’, in Andreas Fischer-
Lescano/Hans-Peter Gasser/Thilo Marauhn/Natalino Ronzitti (eds), Frieden in Freiheit 
– Peace in liberty – Paix en liberté. Festschrift für Michael Bothe zum 70. Geburtstag, 
Baden-Baden 2008, 81-101. 
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dressed the question whether such missions comply with international law. 
This is exactly the point at which this formal-democratic logic has to be bro-
ken. It should be replaced by a strategy to empower the ECJ, the European 
Court of Human Rights, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other na-
tional courts – such as Italian courts in the case of actions for damages against 
Germany by victims of National Socialism – to restrict national sovereignty 
and strengthen individual victim’s rights to compensation and legal protection 
under international law vis-à-vis ‘sovereign’ nation-states. 
The Germany currently sues before the ICJ, arguing that the Italian rulings 
violate German sovereignty. The action is just as scandalous as the fact that 
Germany accepts the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, but in matters of mili-
tary operations, like the granting of overflight rights, etc., declared a provision 
of sovereignty and hence a jurisdictional exception.18 Such sovereignty ide-
ologies have to be fiercely criticised. The increase of interdependence through 
internationalisation and not re-nationalisation has to be the program of legal 
politics for a social Europe. 
3. Conclusion: Prospects for Radical Democracy in Europe 
Radical democracy in Europe must strengthen also those democratic and legal 
procedures beyond national parliaments and replace projects of national elite 
rule with a legal politics for Europe, which emphasises the central nexus of so-
cial and democratic rights. With Wolfgang Abendroth we have to insist that 
the democratic and social idea must be designed to be extendable to the entire 
– and this means today also the European and global – ‘economic and social 
order as well as the cultural life’.19 
To create the European process in a radically democratic fashion and to 
strengthen forms of participation beyond the nation-state is no small challenge. 
If one wants to accept the struggle for democratic and social rights in Europe, 
national constitutional courts must not be converted into undertakers of the 
European idea, but they have to be taken seriously as arenas in a legal-political 
struggle for a social and democratic European law in the network of transna-
tional courts. 
                                                 
18  See the declaration of the German foreign minister, ‘Declaration recognizing as com-
pulsory the jurisdiction of the ICJ’, 30.4.2008 (<http://untreaty.un.org/English/CNs/ 
2008/301_400/357E.pdf>); see also BT-Drs. 16/9218; for a critique, see Diether Deise-
roth, ‘Kriegseinsätze ohne völkerrechtliche Kontrolle. Doppelter deutscher Militärvor-
behalt gegenüber dem IGH’, in Grundrechtereport, Frankfurt am Main 2009, 209-213. 
19  Abendroth, note 9 above. 
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A social and radically democratic Europe cannot by realized by the accu-
mulation of national people’s spirits, or national and supranational citizens-
hips, which are based on the exclusion of non-citizens, but by the establishing 
of an inclusive public sphere that transcends etatist exclusions. To strengthen 
the social preconditions of this transnational public sphere, to make enfor-
ceable its rights to strike, to assemble, to demonstrate, to resist, to participate, 
to be compensated, rights to be protected from the state, etc., and to make them 
effective before European courts, the project of an emancipatory legal politics 
for Europe aims to make the European social and economic order the subject 
of the democratic process. 
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More Democracy in the European Union?! Mixed Messages 
from the German Lisbon Ruling  
Ulrike Liebert 
1. The GCC Lisbon Ruling and the Issue of Democratic  
Legitimacy Beyond the State  
Although the Treaty of Lisbon (EUT-Lisbon) aims at enhancing the democ-
ratic legitimacy of the Union1, by its Lisbon ruling the German Constitutional 
Court (GCC) – traditionally self-defined as the watchdog of Germany’s 
‘guarded democracy’ – has only reluctantly embraced the most recent EU 
treaty reform.2 As regards the provisions on democracy included in the new 
treaty, the GCC’s judgement conveys rather mixed messages. Joseph Weiler, a 
more ‘seasoned’ observer, notes that unsurprisingly, the GCC did not ‘derail 
the process of European integration in so important a case’, but like a ‘dog that 
barks but does not bite’ accompanied its Lisbon ruling by an inconsistent rea-
soning with strengths, shortcomings and also contradictions: ‘A decision with 
lights and shadows, some conflicting tendencies, some painful displays of shal-
lowness and lack of political imagination, and some veritable soaring passages 
and profound reflection’.3 Turned quickly into a catalyst of contested transna-
                                                 
1  The Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union of 2001 had placed 
‘more democracy, transparency and efficiency in the European Union’ on the banner 
of treaty reform, see Bulletin EU 12-2001, I.27; the Treaty of Lisbon amending the 
Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, 
signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007 (2007/C 306/01), Official Journal of the Euro-
pean Union C 306, title II., Art. 8 A, B and C establishes a new title with provisions 
on democratic principles for the activities and functions of the Union, including citi-
zens’ equality, representative democracy, participatory and consultation mechanisms, 
such as the citizens’ legislative initiative, and the role of National Parliaments. For an 
analysis of the chapter on the democratic life in the EU’s Constitutional Treaty, see 
Ulrike Liebert, ‘Der Verfassungsvertrag: Ein Fortschritt für die demokratische Legi-
timität in der Europäischen Union?’, in Mathias Jopp/Saskia Matl (eds), Der Vertrag 
über eine Verfassung für Europa. Analysen zur Konstitutionalisierung der EU, Baden-
Baden 2005, 383-410. 
2  See BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 vom 30.6.2009, Absatz-Nr. (1-421), <http://www.bverfg.de/ 
entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html>. 
3  Joseph H. Weiler, ‘Editorial: The “Lisbon Urteil” and the Fast Food Culture’, Euro-
pean Journal of International Law 20(3) (October 22, 2009). <http://www.ejil. 
org/pdfs/20/3/1857.pdf >. 
Ulrike Liebert 
 72
tional public debate4, the GCC judgement has been praised or, conversely, 
criticised, on the one hand, for taking popular sovereignty and democracy seri-
ously5, for erecting the Basic Law as an ‘integration barrier’ against the build-
ing of a EU state6, for placing German EU politics and the European Court of 
Justice under ‘total control’7, for interpreting the Basic Law lopsidedly in fa-
vour of German sovereignty, and even for sending German EU politics and 
law down a dead-end street.8 On the other hand, the Lisbon ruling clearly en-
dorses the Lisbon Treaty provisions for expanding majority decision-making, 
and for empowering the European Parliament by co-decision-making, among 
others. How, then, does one make sense of this ‘mixed bag’ that the GCC of-
fers for the puzzle of democratic legitimacy in the EU?  
In order to answer this question for the Lisbon ruling, I suggest reading the 
German Court ruling as part of the larger debate about whether domestic de-
mocracy is necessarily diminished or whether it can also be reconciled with 
multi- or supranational organisations, such as the EU. Likewise, I propose un-
derstanding the Lisbon judgement as an outcome of discursive struggles – not 
only among litigants and defendants but also among the judges of the Second 
Senate and the academic and intellectual positions by which they are informed. 
In particular, I argue that the GCC’s Lisbon judgement contains contrasting 
discursive strands that can be best understood through the lens of a dialogue 
                                                 
4  Michael Bothe, ‘The Judgement of the German Federal Constitutional Court Regard-
ing the Constitutionality of the Lisbon Treaty’, Istituto Affari Internazionali 
(IAI0920); Daniel Halberstam and Christoph Möllers, ‘The German Constitutional 
Court says “Ja zu Deutschland!”’, German Law Journal 10(8) (August 2009); Alfred 
Grosser, ‘The Federal Constitutional Court’s Lisbon Case: Germany’s “Sonderweg”: 
An Outsider’s Perspective’, idem. 
5  K.F.Gärditz/C.Hillgruber, ‘Volkssouveränität und Demokratie ernst genommen – 
Zum Lissabon-Urteil des BVerfG’, JuristenZeitung (2009), 872 ff.  
6  Dieter Grimm, ‘Das Grundgesetz als Riegel vor einer Verstaatlichung der Europäi-
schen Union’, Der Staat (4/2009, forthcoming); Peter Becker/Andreas Maurer, ‘Deut-
sche Integrationsbremsen. Folgen und Gefahren des Karlsruher Urteils für Deutsch-
land und die EU’, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP-Aktuell 41 (July 2009).  
7  See Christian Calliess, ‘Unter Karlsruher Totalaufsicht’, FAZ, 27 August 2009, 8. 
8  Carl Otto Lenz, ‘Ausbrechender Rechtsakt. Das Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 
zum EU-Vertrag von Lissabon legt das integrationsoffene Grundgesetz in einer einseitig 
restriktiven Weise aus. Das Gericht begibt sich in eine politische Rolle und behindert die 
Schaffung eines vereinten Europa’, FAZ, 8 August 2009, 7; Armin von Bogdandy, ‘Prin-
zipien der Rechtsfortbildung im europäischen Rechtsraum’, NJW 1-2 (2010), 1-5; 
W. Frenz, ‘Unanwendbares Europarecht nach Maßgabe des BVerfG?’, EWS (2009), 
297 ff.; Thomas Oppermann, ‘Den Musterknaben ins Bremserhäuschen! – Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht und Lissabon-Vertrag’, EuZW (2009), 473; Christoph Schönberger, ‘Lisbon 
in Karlsruhe: Maastricht’s Epigones at Sea’, German Law Journal (2009), 1201 ff. 
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between competing models for reconstituting democracy in Europe.9 In con-
trast to the two prevailing interpretations of the Lisbon judgement – the na-
tional sovereignist and the anti-supranational statist – I put forward a third, 
‘consequentialist democratic’ reading of the GCC ruling regarding the legiti-
macy of the EU. This aims at assessing the legitimacy of the supranational Un-
ion of states in terms of the impacts it has for the quality of domestic democra-
cies.10 In the following I will develop this argument in three steps, by inspect-
ing the Lisbon ruling more closely from the angles, first, of ‘delegating na-
tional democracy’, second, of a supranational federal republic, and, third, of a 
confederation of sovereign democracies, before drawing a synthesis and con-
clusion.  
2. Cherishing ‘Delegating Democracy’ in a Europe of  
Sovereign States 
An interpretation of the German Lisbon judgement from a sovereignist angle 
offers strong proof for the GCC’s stance in favour of a European legal order 
conceived of as an international treaty, based on ‘delegated authority’ and 
premised on national sovereignty:  
– supporting the view that the states are to remain the ‘masters of the Trea-
ties’,11the GCC exhibits a clear sympathy for an international treaty 
rather than a European constitution;  
– premised on the member governments’ delegation of legal and bureau-
cratic competences to the EU, it links the authority of the EU to the ‘prin-
ciple of conferral’, that is a ‘mechanism of protection to preserve the 
Member States’ responsibility’12;  
– affirming the ‘continuing sovereignty of the people (…) anchored in the 
                                                 
9  Ulrike Liebert/Hans-Jörg Trenz, ‘Between norms and practices of the public sphere. As-
sessing the infrastructures for democracy in Europe’, in Erik O. Eriksen/John Erik Fos-
sum (eds), Reconstituting Democracy in Europe – Theory in Practice, RECON Report No 
8, ARENA Report 2/09, Oslo (September 2009), 163-196. Available online at: 
<http://www.reconproject.eu/projectweb/portalproject/Report8_TheoryInPractice.html>. 
10  My third reading of the GCC Lisbon ruling aims at applying and testing for the EU 
under Lisbon the propositions for democracy-enhancing multilateral organisations; see 
Robert O. Keohane/Stephen Macedo/Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Democracy-Enhancing 
Multilateralism’, International Organization 63 (2009), 1-31.  
11  GCC, para 334. 
12  GCC, para 301. 
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Member States’13 and ‘contained in the last instance in the German Con-
stitution’14, it conditions the further expansion of integration on the ‘prin-
ciple of democracy’, that is a ‘fundamental right for a democratically 
elected representative who has still something to decide’15; 
– claiming for itself the final decision competence, the GCC defines its role 
as that of a ‘last resort’ in exceptional situations,16 that is in cases where 
‘it is for the Federal Republic of Germany due to its responsibility for in-
tegration, to work towards a change, and if the worst comes to the worst, 
even to refuse to further participate in the European Union’.17  
In sum, the GCC strongly affirms the principle of democracy as it is estab-
lished by the Basic Law and protected by its ‘eternity clause’.18 Moreover, it 
attaches it to the sovereign people, defined by ‘the citizens’ right to determine, 
in equality and freedom, public authority with regard to persons and subject-
matters through elections and other votes’.19 Arguably, this is a conflation of 
the principle of democracy with particular institutional forms, and with impor-
tant implications: It risks obscuring needs for enhancing existing, as well as 
possibilities for re-configuring new forms of democracy. In fact, by fusing the 
democratic principle with the existing institutional form of electoral democ-
racy, majority rule and parliamentary government the GCC calls for safeguard-
ing the institutional status quo. Notably, the GCC does not address the more 
structural deficits of domestic-party parliamentary processes regarding Euro-
pean political representation and participation, although it mandates new legis-
lation for the Lisbon Treaty ratification, aimed at strengthening the German 
Parliament and, in particular, the opposition. Concerns for the disconnection of 
domestic democratic politics from supranational decision-making are limited 
to legislation, while epistemological, political and other constraints are ig-
nored. The question is whether cherishing the established forms of democratic 
legitimisation within the domestic realm has also prevented the GCC from en-
dorsing supranational modes of institutionalising democracy.  
                                                 
13  GCC, para 334. 
14  GCC, para 340. 
15  GCC, paras 178, 181. 
16  GCC, paras 240, 245. 
17  GCC, para 264. 
18  Art. 79, Abs 3.  
19  GCC, para 211b. 
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3. Endorsing Cautiously a Supranational Democratic Union  
The Lisbon judgement, although foremost caring for the constitutional identity 
of the German Grundgesetz, also endorses the Lisbon Treaty’s ‘Provisions on 
Democratic Principles’, as concerns the supranational level. Its support rests on 
the newly introduced principle of ‘Europarechtsfreundlichkeit’ (European-law 
friendliness) to which the Basic Law as well as all constitutional powers of the 
FRG are committed and which requires them to ‘participate in the develop-
ment of a democratic, social and federal European Union’.20 However, the 
CGG cautions against over-interpreting the Lisbon Treaty as a trigger for ef-
fectively transforming the EU into a supranational democratic federal state.  
In formal constitutional terms, the Treaty of Lisbon introduces elements of 
supranational statehood:21 First, from state symbols that are recognised by a 
large number of member states, to the widening of Council majority decision-
making and to European Parliamentary co-decision-making becoming the rule, 
the institutional set-up of the Union becomes more state-like than before. Fur-
thermore, although ‘citizenship of the Union’ is conceived as ‘additional to na-
tional citizenship (Art. 8), citizens are acknowledged as being ‘directly repre-
sented at Union level in the European Parliament’ and, thus, as the constitu-
ency of the latter (Art. 8A, 2). Moreover, the preamble of the Treaty as well as 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights outline the values on which the constitu-
tional order of the EU rests. Finally, although the Lisbon Treaty does not es-
tablish the principle of primacy of EU law, it includes a ‘17. Declaration con-
                                                 
20  The German Basic Law, Article 23 [European Union – Protection of basic rights – 
Principle of subsidiarity] establishes: (1) With a view to establishing a united Europe, 
the Federal Republic of Germany shall participate in the development of the European 
Union that is committed to democratic, social and federal principles, to the rule of 
law, and to the principle of subsidiarity, and that guarantees a level of protection of 
basic rights essentially comparable to that afforded by this Basic Law. To this end the 
Federation may transfer sovereign powers by a law with the consent of the Bundesrat. 
21  Normatively speaking, a democratic European federal state would be expected to rest 
on a) a unitary and state-like entity at the Union level similar to democratic states at 
the national level; b) a notion of democratic legitimacy of the multilevel EU polity 
that is rooted primarily in the constituencies of the supranational institutions and sec-
ondarily in those of the member states; c) a European constitutional democratic order 
based on shared cultural and social norms that serve to avoid or regulate conflict; d) a 
process of European constitution-building where EU law enjoys primacy over national 
constitutional laws that are required to change, for adapting to EU primary law; see 
Erik O. Eriksen/John E. Fossum, ‘Europe’s challenge. Reconstituting Europe or re-
constituting democracy’, in Eriksen/Fossum (eds), RECON. Theory in Practice, RE-
CON Report No 8, ARENA Report 2/09, Oslo (September 2009). 
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cerning primacy’ that describes the primacy of EU law as a matter of fact, or 
by convention. 
Reading the German Lisbon judgement through the lens of a model of the 
federal democratic state, we find that the GCC in principle supports it, albeit 
with contradictions and reservations, as regards its feasibility, and with some 
caveats, regarding the requirements for legitimating this model:  
–  In principle, sovereignty for the GCC does not mean per se that a number 
of sovereign powers ‘must remain in the hands of the state’, but that these 
may comprise also a political union: ‘Political union means the joint exer-
cise of public authority, including the legislative authority, which even 
reaches into the traditional core areas of the state’s area of competence.’22 
However, in the next paragraph, the GCC defines the scope of material 
areas that Member States need for retaining ‘sufficient space for the po-
litical formation of the economic, cultural and social circumstances of 
life’, namely state citizenship, state monopoly of violence, fiscal deci-
sions, criminal law, culture and education, freedom of opinion, press, as-
sembly, religion and social welfare.23   
–  As regards conditions for supranational democratic legitimacy, the Lisbon 
ruling is not without tensions, either. On the one hand, it recognizes Un-
ion citizenship as a constituency of the EU, affirming that the Lisbon 
Treaty changes the EP’s composition so that it will no longer consist of 
‘representatives of the people of the States brought together in the Com-
munity’ but of ‘representatives of the “Union’s citizens”’.24 It further ac-
knowledges that ‘the citizens of the Union are granted a right to partici-
pate in the democratic life of the Union (Article 10.3, Article 11.1 TEU-
Lisbon), which emphasises a necessary structural connection between the 
civic polity and public authority’.25  
–  However, on the other hand, the current practices of the EP do not live up 
to normative requirements.26 To European citizens, the status of legiti-
mating subjects is negated,27 since voting rules do not comply with ‘the 
democratic precept of electoral equality’ and majority rule, neither in the 
Council nor in the EP.28 Neither do the calls by the Treaty of Lisbon for 
                                                 
22  GCC, para 248. 
23  GCC, para 249. 
24  GCC, para 42. 
25  GCC, para 348. 
26  GCC, paras 271, 276, 295. 
27  GCC, para 347. 
28  GCC, paras 292, 294. 
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participatory democracy suffice: ‘If such … calls are … converted into 
normative statements, which is partly done by the Treaty of Lisbon, with-
out this being connected with an elaboration of the institutions that takes 
due account of equality, they are not suited to introduce a fundamentally 
new model on the level of the law.’29 
–  Finally, the transformation of the EU into a federal democratic state would 
require constitutional revisions of the German Basic Law. The GCC is 
ready to acknowledge the existence of a functional constitution at the Un-
ion level30 as well as the primacy of EU law over national primary law, but 
requires from a state-like development more: ‘To the extent that the devel-
opment of the European Union in analogy to a state would be continued on 
the basis of the Treaty of Lisbon, which is open to development in this con-
text, this would be in contradiction to constitutional foundations. Such a 
step, however, has not been made by the Treaty of Lisbon’.31 
In sum, against much of the rhetoric that had accompanied the post-Laeken 
process, the GCC’s skeptical reasoning cautions both European federalists as 
well as anti-federalists. Thus, although the German judges do not exclude the 
possibility of a European federal democratic state in principle, in practice they 
underscore its current shortcomings. While cherishing national democratic 
sovereignty in a Union of states, they also acknowledge the evolving practices 
of transnational, multi-lateral and multilevel governance. But they also make 
clear, which preconditions they expect a ‘Federal Republic of Europe’32 to 
meet if this is to claim democratic legitimacy.  
4. Embracing a Democracy-Enhancing Association of States, 
Courts and Peoples 
My final reading of the Lisbon ruling addresses the issue of what preconditions 
democratic legitimacy in the context of the EU requires when looked at neither 
exclusively through the lens of national democratic sovereignties nor solely 
through those of a supranational democratic republic. Instead, I assume that 
peoples’ democratic sovereignties and the defence of the European Union on 
democratic grounds need to be reconciled. Instead of exacerbated conflict and 
                                                 
29  GCC, para 295. 
30  GCC, para 231. 
31  GCC, para 376. 
32  See Stefan Collignon, Bundesrepublik Europa? Die demokratische Herausforderung 
und Europas Krise, Berlin 2008.  
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competition, the complementarities between both are what counts. Democratic 
procedures that are taken for granted at the domestic state level – such as ma-
jority rule and electoral equality – and projected onto the supranational level 
will not necessarily do the job, since these might have adverse effects on the 
quality of domestic democracies. Alternative standards for normatively assess-
ing European constitutional developments are needed. To legitimate the Union 
in the terms of democracy and in a federal system, its consequences for the 
democratic quality of its component parts must take centre stage.  
Adopting the angle of the EU as a ‘democracy-enhancing’ supranational 
organisation under the Lisbon Treaty, I propose assessing its implications for 
the quality of domestic democracies, measured by four standards: 33  
–  Whether supranational organisations will serve the protection of individ-
ual and human rights in the member states by adopting provisions such 
as, for instance, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights;  
–  To what extent supranational regimes will restrict the power of special-
interest factions that may have gone unchecked within member states, by 
establishing supranational judicial bodies or Constitutional Courts, such 
as the ECJ, or by supranational transparency, accountability, representa-
tion and participation regimes, such as the Social Dialogue, or the Civic 
Dialogue in the EU;  
–  How supranational organisations will enhance the quality of democratic 
deliberation within the member states on EU policy making, for instance 
by empowering national parliaments for subsidiarity control, or by en-
hancing interparliamentary cooperation, such as, for instance, COSAC; or 
by introducing a citizens’ legislative initiative;  
–  Whether supranational organisations will create public goods of general 
interest by expanding effective problem solving to areas where nation 
states have failed, such as for instance to problems of international finan-
cial crisis management, global climate change or energy security policies.  
If we assess the Lisbon ruling through the lens of a (domestic) democracy -
enhancing supranational Union, the GCC can be credited for having contrib-
uted towards this framework as well as standing in its way. On the one hand, 
the democratic value added by European integration under Lisbon is reflected 
by the GCC’s reasoning in a number of points:  
–  Fundamentally, the Maastricht ruling’s concept of Verbund has been fur-
                                                 
33  I am borrowing here from ‘democracy-enhancing multilateralism’, coined by Keo-
hane, Macedo, and Moravcsik, see note 10 above.  
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ther developed, defined now as ‘a close long-term association of states 
which remain sovereign, … and in which the peoples of their Member 
states … remain the subjects of democratic legitimisation’.34 It describes 
the EU as a complex of sovereign national states that are mutually com-
mitted to openness, integration and international law.  
–  Moreover, democratic legitimisation goes beyond electoral democracy, it 
requires also at the domestic level a viable public sphere: ‘…democracy 
first and foremost lives on, and in, a viable public opinion that concen-
trates on central acts of determination of political direction and the peri-
odic allocation of highest-ranking political offices in the competition …. 
Only this public opinion makes visible the alternatives for elections and 
other votes’35.  
–  In addition, the GCC acknowledges the ‘sui-generis nature’ of the EU, 
depicting it as a ‘system of federal and supranational intertwining of 
power’,36 and concluding that ‘the democracy of the European Union 
cannot, and need not, be shaped in analogy to that of a state. Instead, the 
European Union is free to look for its own ways of democratic supple-
mentation by means of additional, novel forms of transparent or participa-
tive political decision-making’.37 For instance, the GCC sees citizens’ 
consultation and participation by the EU as complementary, according to 
‘the precept of providing, in a suitable manner, the citizens of the Union 
and “representative” associations with the possibility of making their 
views heard, as well as the elements of associative and direct democracy’; 
and it admits that calls for a ‘Citizens’ Europe’ or the ‘strengthening of 
the European Parliament’ could ‘politically convey the European level’ in 
the domestic realm.  
On the other hand, the GCC keeps a number of obstacles in the way of a full-
fledged normative template for assessing EU treaty reforms by the standards of 
a ‘democracy-enhancing’ supranational organisation. The Lisbon ruling does 
not fully escape the grip of traditional dualisms, conducive to unnecessary ten-
sions, if not contradictions. Conflicts loom large, as far as the dichotomous 
construction of national state sovereignty vs. supranational statehood is main-
tained. These tensions emerge from binary thinking, juxtaposing national and 
supranational statehood (see above, 3.). By contrast, making a case for com-
plementarities, the GCC proclaims that: ‘Neither the additional rights of par-
                                                 
34  GCC, para 229. 
35  GCC, para 250. 
36  GCC, para 246. 
37  GCC, para, 272. 
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ticipation, which are strongly interlocked as regards the effects of their many 
levels of action and in view of the large number of national parliaments, nor 
rights of petition which are associative and have a direct effect vis-à-vis the 
Commission are suited to replace the majority rule which is established by an 
election. They are intended to, and indeed can, ultimately increase the level of 
legitimisation all the same under the conditions of a Staatenverbund with re-
stricted tasks’.38 
5. Synthesis and Conclusions 
The question that has been explored here is whether and how the German Lis-
bon judgment conveys a coherent message about a democratically appropriate 
European order and how this resonates with the current intellectual and politi-
cal debate. Karlsruhe can be commended for placing the democratic deficits of 
European integration centre stage, for protecting the German constitutional 
identity against ‘excessive federalisation’ and, moreover, for calling the 
Bundestag and Bundesrat to effectively assume their democratic ‘Integrations-
verantwortung’. Yet, an exclusively ‘democratic sovereignist’ reading misses 
the specific ‘Europe-friendliness’ of the messages conveyed by the GCC’s 
Lisbon ruling. In particular, the GCC’s insistence on high thresholds for a 
European democratic federal state is not necessarily reluctance tout court, but 
should be read as the claim that a ‘Constitutional moment’ and the revision of 
the Basic Law are required at the threshold from the status quo of a confederal 
union to ‘supranational statehood’.  
Summarising my account, I would hardly praise the Federal Court by virtue 
of its most recent contribution to the international, European and German con-
stitutional conversation about the question of democracy for offering a coher-
ent and authoritative message or clear-cut model of European democracy, ca-
pable of unambiguously informing political practices, and instructing the gen-
eral public. Instead of proposing a sole device for how to (re-)build democracy 
in the EU polity, the Lisbon judgement leaves room for tensions between con-
trasting ideas. I have proposed a reading of the judgement that goes beyond 
tensions and conflicting tendencies between positions of different persuasions 
in the Court’s reasoning. In particular, I have pointed to some more carefully 
considered pronouncements with a potential for guiding future developments 
towards a (domestic) democracy -enhancing European Union. In this sense, I 
have sought to draw a more nuanced account of the German Lisbon judgement 
compared to critical legal interpretations or political contestations that have 
                                                 
38  GCC, para 294. 
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taken issue with it.39 Overall, the Lisbon reasoning can be criticised for not yet 
escaping tensions between dichotomous normative schemes that are in the way 
of developing the democracy-enhancing potential of European ‘multilevel con-
stitutionalism’40, or that inhibit a more full-fledged European association of 
constitutional courts.41 But the GCC should not be accused for lacking insights 
into the necessity, nor suffering from a poverty of imagination regarding the 
upgrading of the quality of domestic democracy through supranational consti-
tutional reform. Thus, the Staatenverbund that was conceived by the Maas-
tricht ruling has been developed by the Lisbon judgement to comprise an asso-
ciation of democratic peoples. If in this complex polity, the sovereignties of the 
diverse parts would hold together by the principles of democracy-enhancing 
Union, they would constitute a European demoi-cracy.42 
 
                                                 
39  See note 7 and note 8 above. 
40  Ingolf Pernice, The Treaty of Lisbon: Multilevel Constitutionalism in Action, WHI, 
Berlin (February 2009). 
41  Andreas Voßkuhle, GCC Vicepresident, ‘Der europäische Verfassungsgerichts-
verbund’, talk given at the Bavarian regional representation at the EU, Brussels 
(3.11.2009) 
42  For the idea of a European demoi-cracy, see Kalypso Nicolaidis, ‘We the peoples of 
Europe’, Foreign Affairs (2004), and James Bohman, Democracy Across Borders. 
From Demos to Demoi, Cambridge MA 2007. 
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After the Lisbon Ruling: Where Is Social Democracy? 
Kolja Möller 
In the German public sphere, the constitutional court is not only regarded as 
‘bouche de la loi’ (Montesquieu) but as an agency of veridiction which is per-
ceived to be highly committed to the general public interest. It seems to stand 
above political conflicts and assumes a truth-telling role.1 Therefore it is not 
entirely surprising that political elites welcomed the Lisbon ruling of the Ger-
man Constitutional Court (GCC): given such circumstances, criticisms of the 
GCC judgments and the questioning of their moral authority do not appear to 
indicate a promising move. What is astonishing about the GCC ruling and the 
German debate on the Lisbon treaty is that, seemingly, ‘social democracy’ is 
not given due recognition: while the GCC draws on a nation-stated fixated and 
statist conception of democracy, parts of the German progressive camp echo 
this approach to European integration and reside in a defensive attitude to-
wards European solidarity and democracy. Not the least, this defensive attitude 
is inspired by a critical view on the recent judgments of the ECJ on Laval, Vi-
king and Rüffert and the market-liberal constitutionalism which emerges on 
the European level.2 However, it’s questionable if such a new realism on the 
dominance of market liberal constitutionalism must obligatorily lead to a 
praise of the GCC judgment or if the GCC judgment rather implies obstacles to 
the reconstruction of solidarity and democracy in Europe. In the following, it is 
illustrated that the conception of democracy highlighted by the GCC strongly 
contrasts with the idea of ‘social democracy’ which played an important role 
within progressive German constitutional discourse since World War II. Thus 
it seems to be problematic to interpret the GCC judgment in terms of a ‘de-
mocratizing’ verdict. Most prominently, it was the political and legal scientist 
Wolfgang Abendroth who interpreted Art. 20 and Art. 28 of the German Basic 
                                                 
1  See for a critical view on the authority of the GCC, Ingeborg Maus, Zur Aufklärung 
der Demokratietheorie. Rechts- und demokratietheoretische Überlegungen im An-
schluss an Kant, Frankfurt am Main 1992, 60. I borrow the idea that political institu-
tions entail mechanisms of verdicition and politics of truth from the late Michel Fou-
cault. See his recently published lectures, Le gouvernement de soi et des autres. Cours 
au Collège de France 1982-1983, Paris 2008. 
2  For a genealogy, see Sonja Buckel/Lukas Oberndorfer, ‘Die lange Inkubationszeit des 
Wettbewerbs der Rechtsordnungen – Eine Genealogie der Rechtsfälle Viking/Laval/ 
Rüffert/Luxemburg aus der Perspektive einer materialistischen Europarechtstheorie’, in 
Andreas Fischer-Lescano/Florian Rödl/Christoph Schmid (eds), Europäische Gesell-
schaftsverfassung. Zur Konstitutionalisierung sozialer Demokratie in Europa. Schriften-
reihe des Zentrums für Europäische Rechtspolitik, Bd. 53, Baden-Baden 2009. 
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Law (the demokratische und soziale Rechtsstaat) as a principle that broadens 
scope for a not merely political but also ‘social’ democracy, extending co-
determination to the sphere of economy and civil society (1). The conception 
of social democracy attempts to put the whole social and economic order at the 
disposal of democratic self-rule. Acknowledging the ‘democratic deficit’ of the 
European Union and the growing social interdependencies on the transnational 
level, it seems to be an interesting project to re-conceptualize this strand of 
constitutional discourse.3 Contrary to the approach of social democracy, the 
GCC defends a narrow and conservative interpretation of the German Basic 
Law mirroring Ernst Forsthoff’s claim of legitimacy through a Staatswillens-
bildungsprozess (2.). From a viewpoint of social democracy both – the emerg-
ing market liberal constitutionalism within the EU as well as the GCC judg-
ment – are deficient and somehow intertwined: while market-liberal constitu-
tionalism4 rejects all attempts to establish a European social model, the GCC 
declares the Europeanization of democracy, budget policies and tax policies to 
be incompatible with the German Basic Law.5 Hence it is crucial to search for 
pathways beyond this ordoliberal amalgam of free-market capitalism and na-
tion-state democracy in order to renew the conception of social democracy on 
the European level (3.). 
1. Social Democracy: The Legacy of Progressive  
Constitutional Discourse 
In German constitutional discourse, one can easily identify a strand of reasoning 
which originated from the debates in the Weimar Republic and made its way to 
the foundational phase of the Basic Law after World War II. Political and legal 
scientists such as Herrmann Heller, Franz L. Neumann and Otto Kirchheimer 
challenged the authoritarian Staatsrechtslehre by tracing the interdependencies 
                                                 
3  See Oliver Eberl, ‘Soziale Demokratie in Europa zwischen Konstitutionalismus und 
Etatismus’, in Andreas Fischer-Lescano/Florian Rödl/Christoph Schmid (eds), Euro-
päische Gesellschaftsverfassung. Zur Konstitutionalisierung sozialer Demokratie in 
Europa. Schriftenreihe des Zentrums für Europäische Rechtspolitik, Bd. 53, Baden-
Baden 2009, 205-218. 
4  Stephen Gill, ‘European governance and new constitutionalism: Economic and mone-
tary union and alternatives to disciplinary neoliberalism in Europe’, in New political 
economy 3 (1) (1998), 5-22. 
5  GCC, para 249: ‘Essential areas of democratic formative action comprise, inter alia, 
citizenship, the civil and the military monopoly on the use of force, revenue and ex-
penditure including external financing and all elements of encroachment that are deci-
sive for the realisation of fundamental rights (...).’ 
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of political, social and legal domination.6 Although all three came to different 
conclusions regarding the legitimacy of the Weimarer Republik’s constitution, 
they shared a particular perspective on constitutionalism. According to them, 
constitutional discourse can only be elucidated when the ‘social substrate’ of le-
gal orders is addressed.7 In modern capitalist societies social, political and legal 
domination are interlinked phenomena which cannot be isolated from each 
other. Furthermore, political institutions are deeply over-determined by eco-
nomic power relations and often overwhelmed by powerful actors.8 
In the foundational phase of the BRD, Wolfgang Abendroth refined the pro-
gressive constitutional discourse and proposed an interpretation of the German 
Basic Law in the light of ‘social democracy’.9 In his opinion, the definition of 
Germany as sozialer and demokratischer Bundesstaat, as provided under Article 
20 of the German Basic Law, and the formula demokratischer und sozialer 
Rechtsstaat, as embodied within Article 28, should be seen as a commitment to 
a conception of democratic self-rule that represents more than just a narrow rule-
of-law principle and a statal democracy.10 First, he departs from the fact that 
modern societies are coined by a class divide rooted in the capitalist mode of 
production. The modern nation-state and its political and administrative institu-
tions tend to be a formative aspect of capitalist economies because they provide 
the necessary legal framework for bourgeois rule. Obviously, Abendroth as-
sumes a far-reaching heterogeneity among different social classes in modern so-
cieties which directly affects the legal and political sphere. Modern society is 
‘grounded on capitalist relations of production’ and therefore remains an ‘an-
                                                 
6  See Franz L. Neumann, ‘Der Funktionswandel des Gesetzes im Recht der bürgerli-
chen Gesellschaft (1937)’, in Neumann, Demokratischer und autoritärer Staat – Bei-
träge zur Soziologie der Politik, Frankfurt am Main 1967, 7-57; Otto Kirchheimer, 
‘Weimar – und was dann? Analyse einer Verfassung (1930)’, in Kirchheimer, Politik 
und Verfassung, Frankfurt am Main 1964, 9-56; H. Heller, Staatslehre (1934), 6. Auf-
lage, Tübingen 1983. 
7  Franz L. Neumann, Die Herrschaft des Gesetzes (1936), Frankfurt am Main 1980, 33. 
8  One should be cautious to consider the fundamental tension between political democ-
racy and social class relations only as a critical-theory issue. Tellingly the republican 
tradition also deals with the relation of power and political self-determination. For ex-
ample, Niccolò Machiavelli showed in his famous ‘il principe’ how social power rela-
tions affect political institutions and set in motion a constitutive split between the 
‘grandi’ and the ‘populo’. Niccolò Machiavelli, Il principe (1513), Chapter IX; cf. 
Niccolò Machiavelli, Der Fürst, Leipzig 1986, 95 ff. 
9  Most prominently, Wolfgang Abendroth, ‘Zum Begriff des demokratischen und sozia-
len Rechtsstaates im Grundgesetz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’ (1954), in Ge-
sammelte Schriften Band 2, Hannover 2008, 338-357. 
10  Ibidem, 339 ff. 
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tagonistic class society’.11 But as he introduces the mutual relegation of political 
institutions and class structure, Abendroth progresses beyond a functionalistic 
notion of political institutions. According to him, the political and legal frame-
work of modern democracies is a hard-fought area which is sensitive to social 
struggles.12 Most notably, the labour movement imposes counter-powers to 
bourgeois rule and gains achievements while referring to the democratic princi-
ple and extending it to the economic and social sphere. 
Second, Abendroth is sceptical about narrow political democracy which re-
stricts democratic self-determination to institutions of the political system. He 
assumes that under conditions of severe social inequality and recurring eco-
nomic crisis, parts of the ruling class often tend to prefer authoritarian and anti-
democratic ways of dealing with the conflictual basis of capitalist societies: 
‘Either formal democracy of statal institutions is extended to a social democ-
racy (…) or the economic power holders of particular interests within society 
take off the democratic form of political organization (…)’.13 We should not 
forget that Abendroth developed his conception of ‘social’ democracy after the 
rise of fascism in Germany. He qualifies fascism to be driven by certain fac-
tions of the ruling class and the severe concentration of economic power in the 
hands of a few. According to him (and the mainstream post-war political dis-
course in Germany), political democracy in capitalist societies always faces the 
threat of being suspended through anti-liberal parts of the ruling class and/or 
coup d’état. This is the point where the conception of social democracy comes 
into play. The extension of democracy to the social and economic sphere is 
crucial: On the one hand, political democracy can only be consolidated if 
there’s a constitutional acknowledgement of the labour movement and its 
counter-power which hinders the authoritarian factions of the ruling class from 
suspending political democracy and the rule of law. Otherwise, political de-
mocracy will always be susceptible to be transformed into an authoritarian 
state. On the other hand, the scope for the extension of democracy to the social 
and economic sphere, as provided by the Basic Law, places the ‘social and 
economic order at the disposition of democratic will-formation of society’.14 
Following Abendroth, the Basic Law delivers a framework where the democ-
ratic (and therefore peaceful) transformation of society and the economic order 
                                                 
11  Wolfgang Abendroth, ‘Die politische Wissenschaft unter dem besonderen Gesichts-
punkt der Staatslehre’ (1952), in Gesammelte Schriften Band 2, Hannover 2008, 216-
220, 217. 
12  Abendroth, note 9 above, 349. 
13  Wolfgang Abendroth, ‘Funktion der Gewerkschaften in der westdeutschen Demokra-
tie’ (1952), in Gesammelte Schriften Band 2, 216-230, 222. 
14  Abendroth, note 9 above, 346. 
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in the direction of economic democracy is at least conceivable. 
Third, Abendroth interprets the Basic Law not as a divine and everlasting 
Werteordnung, rather he considers it to be a compromise between social 
classes expressing the balance of social forces in post-war Germany: ‘It’s cer-
tain that the legal principle of demokratischer und sozialer Rechtsstaat was 
formulated on the basis of a compromise between diverging political and so-
cial forces.’15 Referring to the constitutional principle of sozialer and demok-
ratischer Rechtsstaat, Abendroth reveals that the Basic Law involves the la-
bour movement in the constitution and paves the way for co-determination and 
a democratic transformation of society – most prominently the capitalist econ-
omy. Having these aspects in mind, the Basic Law appears to be a class com-
promise and a pathway to ‘proceduralize’ the splits and deep heterogeneity of 
capitalist societies. Thus the assumption of a shared ‘German political and 
normative culture’16 influenced by welfare-state principles which needs to be 
defended against European law, is questionable. Neither has there always been 
unanimity about the prominence of the welfare-state principles within German 
constitutional discourse during the last sixty years, nor is the presumption 
plausible that social homogeneity would be a necessary prerequisite for consti-
tution making. Otherwise the establishment of Western Europe’s post-war con-
stitutions – all ‘constitutionalizing’ a particular balance of power among dif-
ferent social classes – would have been simply impossible.17 
2. The GCC Ruling: Staatswillensbildungsprozess Instead of 
Social Democracy 
The GCC ruling on the Lisbon Treaty provides a contrasting interpretation of 
the Basic Law which is similar to that of conservative approaches on law and 
democracy. It assumes a ‘non-transferable identity of the Constitution (Article 
79.3 of the Basic Law), which is not amenable to integration in this respect’18 
expressing shared ‘economic, cultural and social circumstances of life’ as well 
as ‘previous understanding as regards culture, history and language.’19  
                                                 
15  Abendroth, note 9 above, 354. 
16  Fritz W. Scharpf, ‘The Double Asymmetry of European Integration – Or: Why the EU 
Cannot Be a Social Market Economy’, MPIfG Working Paper 2009/12, 33. 
17  See for the severe legal conflicts on the German Welfare State the contributions in 
Ernst Forsthoff (ed), Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Sozialstaatlichkeit. Aufsätze und Essays, 
Darmstadt 1968. 
18  GCC, para 235. 
19  GCC, para 249. 
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Therewith, it interprets the Basic Law as the constitutional framework of a 
concrete order and a shared culture grounded on ‘the possibility of realising 
oneself in one’s own cultural area’20. This is accompanied by a restrictive and 
state-centred interpretation of the democracy principle which restricts democ-
ratic self-determination to the national ‘primary area’.21 Following the GCC’s 
interpretation, the ‘election of bodies’, most notably the national elections, ‘re-
alizes the self-determination of the people’.22 Notwithstanding the emergence 
of democratic practices on the European level, the GCC refers to the unequal 
representation of votes as a means of presenting the European Parliament as an 
institution which is not relevant to democratic legitimacy within Europe.23 
Obviously, a particular tension exists in GCC’s argument evolving around the 
relation between concrete order and the narrow and state-centred conception of 
political democracy. While the GCC insinuates that the Basic Law should be 
seen as expressing a (more or less homogenous) cultural and political identity 
which is undermined by European Law and supranationalism, it curtails the 
process of democratic self-determination in a formalistic manner to the general 
parliamentary elections.24 
Interestingly, this particular tension can also be found in the works of 
Abendroth’s famous antagonist in the post-war period, Ernst Forsthoff.25 A 
follower of Carl Schmitt in many respects, Forsthoff conceives democracy as 
Staatswillensbildungsprozess26 which includes both: the commitment to a 
commonwealth which should be secured by the state, as well as the restriction 
of democracy to parliamentary elections and a negative, almost Lockian notion 
of freedom. In his late publication Der Staat der Industriegesellschaft, 
Forsthoff warns against the danger of ‘polycracy’ emerging out of post-war 
                                                 
20  GCC, para 260; see for a critique of the homogeneity aspect in the GCC judgement, 
Robert Christian van Ooyen, ‘Eine “europafeindliche” Kontinuität? Zum Politikver-
ständnis der Lissabon-Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts’, in Internationale 
Politik und Gesellschaft 4 (2009), 26-45. 
21  GCC, para 360. 
22  GCC, para 268. 
23  GCC, para 148. 
24  However, the GCC alludes to the possibility that the German people as constituent 
power adheres to a European Federal state through referendum, paras 217, 228. 
25  See his argument against Abendroth and the welfare state as constitutional norm, 
Ernst Forsthoff, ‘Begriff und Wesen des sozialen Rechtsstaates’ (1954), in Forsthoff 
(ed), Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Sozialstaatlichkeit, Darmstadt 1968, 165-200. 
26  Ernst Forsthoff, ‘Verfassungsprobleme des Sozialstaats’ (1954), in Forsthoff (ed), 
Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Sozialstaatlichkeit, Darmstadt 1968, 145-164, 155; see also 
Ernst Forsthoff, Der Staat der Industriegesellschaft, München 1971, 122. 
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corporatism and democratic movements.27 Not the ‘power play of industrial 
society’ among different social and political forces,28 but the state appears to 
be the preserver of common wealth through its execution of appropriate deci-
sions. As ‘Hüter der Ordnung’ Forsthoff locates the state beyond the social 
polycracy preserving the concrete social order of the BRD against attempts to 
change it.29 Contrary to this substantive argument, Forsthoff insisted in the 
controversy with Abendroth on the welfare state that the German Basic Law 
only entails negative freedom and formal legitimacy through parliamentary 
elections apart from a ‘specific social content’.30 This is precisely the reason 
why Forsthoff rejected Abendroth’s approach of social democracy and con-
tested Abendroth’s claim that the welfare-state principle represents a constitu-
tional norm. Although not citing Forsthoff’s reasoning of Staatswillens-
bildungsprozess, the GCC seems to draw on an almost similar amalgam of 
substantive constitutional identity and state-centred approach to the democratic 
principle. Paradigmatically, Forsthoff’s Staatswillensbildungsprozess regards 
the state as the preserver of common wealth deciding in the last instance at the 
substantive level while the parliamentary prelude should integrate the people. 
From the perspective of social democracy in the tradition of Abendroth, this 
ambiguous character of Staatswillensbildungsprozess represents a formative 
aspect of conservative constitutional discourse:31 by introducing a substantive 
idea of concrete order and normative culture which is to be secured by the 
state, it obfuscates the fundamental class divide and heterogeneity which is ex-
pressed in the constitution. Moreover, the paradox of this approach resides in 
the fact that the restriction of democracy to the statal and parliamentary sphere 
perpetuates the existing social constitution in the sense that it accords primacy 
to the prevailing forms of domination in society and economy over the at-
tempts to make them available to co-determination.  
3. Renewing Social Democracy on the European Level 
From the perspective of social democracy, the GCC ruling is lacking in several 
respects because it mainly dwells on the glory of a national Staatswillens-
bildungsprozess. Furthermore, it declares important policy fields such as tax 
                                                 
27  Ernst Forsthoff, Der Staat der Industriegesellschaft, München 1971, 17 and 119 ff. 
28  Ibidem, 27. 
29  Ibidem, 43. 
30  Ernst Forsthoff, Begriff und Wesen des sozialen Rechtsstaates (1954), in Forsthoff 
(ed), Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Sozialstaatlichkeit, Darmstadt 1968, 165-200, 185. 
31  See also Hauke Brunkhorst, ‘Der Mythos des existenziellen Staates. Das europäische 
Kontinuum nationaler und gemeinschaftlicher Gewalten’, in Leviathan 4/2008, 490-500. 
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and budget policies to be tied to the nation-state. In so doing, it creates juridi-
cal obstacles to the creation of a European social model and even obstructs ‘in-
stitutional reforms that widen the channels of democratic influence’.32 Turning 
to the recent debates on the GCC judgment, it’s astonishing that the standpoint 
of social democracy and progressive constitutional discourse is articulated nei-
ther by political parties nor by civil-society actors or trade unions albeit the 
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty makes the reconstruction of a progressive 
constitutional politics on the European level more urgent than ever before.  
Above all, there is no need for the camp of social democracy to defend the 
GCC’s amalgam of cultural primary areas and statal democracy. It is mislead-
ing to echo the GCC’s emphasis on normative and cultural homogeneity as it 
somehow creeps in the recent debates on the GCC’s judgment. Taking into ac-
count Abendroth’s interpretation of the Basic Law even German society was 
and still is moulded by deep heterogeneity and class divides. From such a per-
spective, the European welfare-state tradition appears as the result of social 
struggles discharging into different constitutional arrangements. Thus, it is 
problematic to overvalue the ‘varieties’ of different welfare-state traditions and 
to deduce from this ‘variety-interpretation’ the need to defend a social com-
promise on the national level that has already been revoked by economic and 
political elites. Admittedly, this vicious circle of market-liberal European inte-
gration and nation-state-based constituencies is not easy to challenge. At least, 
from a standpoint of social democracy two political options emerge: 
The first is the pragmatic defence of social achievements at nation-state 
level. Therefore neither a culturalistic reading of democracy nor a praise of the 
GCC’s jugdgement is necessary. Such a defence would only result from the 
incapacity to re-establish any progress on the European level. But having in 
mind the European market integration and the existing ‘constitution’ of Euro-
pean society, it seems not to be a sustainable option which engages with the 
already existing European social constitution.33 A second option seems to be 
more promising: It would be to renew social democracy at European level and 
to explore possibilities for social democracy within European law and the new 
Lisbon Treaty. We should not forget that the welfare-state tradition was a 
compromise that resulted from severe social conflicts. Today, renewing social 
                                                 
32  As Hans-Jürgen Urban, vice-president of the IG Metall, recently postulated: Hans Jür-
gen Urban, ‘Zeit für eine politische Neuorientierung: Die Gewerkschaften und die 
Hoffnung auf ein soziales Europa’, in Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft 4 (2009), 
11-25, 22. 
33  See Andreas Fischer-Lescano/Florian Rödl/Christoph Schmid (eds), Europäische Ge-
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democracy means to engage with the real existing social and political frame-
work of the European Union as well as with the re-foundation of the progres-
sive camp on the transnational level. This process is intrinsically relegated to 
social and political struggles and a democratic alternative to the market-liberal 
pathway which the EU has taken (and the GCC affirmatively legitimated by 
rejecting any claims about the ‘social deficit’34). Contrary to the GCC’s claim 
that the ‘principle of democracy’ does not serve ‘to adapt the normative con-
tent of its provisions to the respective factual situation of the organisation of 
political rule’35, the re-foundation of social democracy could provide the 
chance to reveal once more the essence of democracy: to question the existing 
forms of domination and to make them available to democratic self-
determination, or to put it in the words of Wolfgang Abendroth: to transform 
state and society from a ‘system of domination’ to a ‘system of self-rule’.36 
 
                                                 
34  GCC, paras 394 ff. 
35  GCC, para 267. 
36  Wolfgang Abendroth, ‘Die Verwirklichung des Mitbestimmungsrechts’ (1954), in Ge-
sammelte Schriften Band 2, Hannover 2008, 358-370, 360. 
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